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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF LEADER-MEDIA CONFLICTS THROUGH CENTER-
PERIPHERY PARADIGM: 
 
COMPARING MEDIA REACTIONS AFTER DAVOS UPHEAVAL OF 
R.T.ERDOGAN AND DURBAN-II SPEECH OF M. AHMADINEJAD 
 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2010 
Supervisor: Dr. Ayse Betül Çelik 
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On January 29, 2009, at the Davos International Meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan stormed out after the moderator didn’t allow him to speak during a debate with the Israeli 
president Simon Peres. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at the United Nations Durban 
Review Conference on Racism on April 20, 2009. Delegates from twenty-three countries walked out 
of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech at the UN Durban Review Conference held in 
Geneva in response to his remarks. 
 
The purpose of this study is to endeavor a question a possible link between leader-media 
conflicts and center-periphery dynamics. The main aim of such exploration is to provide a 
better understanding to current leader-media conflicts thus pursue a better resolution. The 
results of the research suggest that there is a certain parallelism between leader-media and 
center-periphery conflicts. Historical traumas and value differences affect the course of 
conflict between a leader and the media. 
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ABSTRACT 
AN ANALYSIS OF LEADER-MEDIA CONFLICTS THROUGH CENTER-
PERIPHERY PARADIGM: 
COMPARING MEDIA REACTIONS AFTER DAVOS UPHEAVAL OF 
R.T.ERDOGAN AND DURBAN-II SPEECH OF M. AHMADINEJAD 
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29 Ocak 2009 tarihinde Türkiye Cumhuriyet başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan İsrail 
cumhurbaşkanı Simon Peres ile münazarası sırasında moderatör konuşmasına izin vermeyince 
Uluslararası Davos Konsferası’nı terk etmişti. 20 Nisan 2009 tarihinde ise Iran 
cumhurbaşkanı Mahmud Ahmedinejad Birleşmiş Milletler Irkçılığa Karşı Durban Gözden 
Geçirme Konferansında yaptığı konuşma sırasında 23 ülkenin delegeleri konferansı terk etti.  
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı lider-medya çatışmaları ve merkez-çevre ilişkileri arasında bir bağlantı 
olup olmadığının değerlendirilmesidir. Böyle bir sorgulamanın amacı günümüz lider-medya 
çatışmalarına daha derin bir anlayış sağlayıp daha sağlıklı bir çözümleme sunulmasını olası 
kılmaktır.  
  
Çalışmanın sonuçları göstermektedir ki lider-medya çatışmalarının sürecinde merkez-çevre 
söylemi ile paralellikler oluşmaktadır. Tarihi travmalar ve değer farklılıkları lider-medya arası 
çatışmanın sürecini etkilemektedir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The main purpose of this research is to analyze the leader media-conflicts through a center-
periphery perspective. Media analysis can provide deeper understanding of social relations 
as it contributes to social construction of reality. This research argues that leader-media 
and center-periphery conflicts have certain parallelism and this can be discovered by 
looking through conflict resolution lenses.  
The importance of this study is to link the conflict resolution field with political science 
and political communication disciplines. Harmonizing a political science theory (centre-
periphery) with conflict resolution theories (leader-media conflicts) allows us to recognize 
a possible link between political science and conflict resolution.  
Furthermore, this research brings a new contribution to conflict resolution field by aiming 
to analyze intergroup conflict through centre-periphery dynamics. The notion of centre-
periphery had only been used in conflict resolution in examining post-Soviet intergroup 
conflicts in ex-Soviet countries. These studies focus on the redistribution of power between 
the center and the periphery in these countries. The establishment of new political system 
is analyzed through decentralization and center-periphery dynamics experienced in the 
USSR1. For example, While Linz and Stepan examine the role of center-periphery 
                                                            
1 Aleksandr Libman, “Cycles of Decentralization in the Post-Soviet Space”, Russian Politics and Law, 
Volume 48, Number 1, January-February 2010, pp.10-14.  
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dynamics in democratic transition2 Michnik, Adam and et al. question the role of center-
periphery relations within the USSR while establishing a transitional justice in these 
developing political systems3. However, there has not been any attempt to examine 
conflicts that had been instigated by the course of modernization. Consequently, this 
research will explore the relationship between the field of Conflict Resolution and the 
studies driven over the notion of Global South.  There are critics emphasizing Conflict 
Resolution studies as a Western-oriented discipline4. The belief that considers Conflict 
Resolution as Western oriented and that also accuses the field for only being defined 
according to Anglo-Saxon culture can be refuted by maintaining a successful application of 
Conflict Resolution theories to a non-Western setting.  
A case study will be introduced about the leader-media interactions after Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan ’s Davos speech5 and the Durban speech of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad6. Those two 
incidents are chosen because of several similarities between them:  
                                                            
2 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan,  Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
London. 1996,  pp.366-370. 
3 Adama Michnik, et al. "Czechoslovakia." In J. Neill Kritz, (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes Vol.II: Country Studies, United States Institute of Peace, 
Washington DC, 1995, pp.542-544. 
4 Paul E. Salem, “A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective”, Negotiation 
Journal, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 1993,  pp.361-369 and Anthony  Wanis- St. John, “Thinking Globally 
and Acting Locally”, Negotiation Journal, Volume 19, Number 4, October 2003, pp. 389-396. 
5 At the Davos International Meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stormed out after the 
moderator didn’t allow him to speak more. During the debate whereas he gave 25 minutes to the Israeli 
Simon Peres and only 12 minutes to the Turkish Prime Minister. Erdogan said: "Peres, you are raising your 
voice because you're trying to hide your guilt, I would raise my voice, too and I could if I want, but in terms 
of respect I am not going to... You know very well how to kill people, I know how you kill babies ... The Torah 
says: Thou Shall not Kill, but killing is taking place (by Israel)." When Erdogan attempted to continue his 
argument the moderator kept cutting his talk and frustrating him, not letting him finish. Erdogan angrily left 
3 
 
First, both of those incidents took place just before elections. Turkey held local elections 
on 29 March 2009, and Iran’s tenth presidential elections took place on 12 June 2009.  Pre-
election period provides an atmosphere where conflict between leader and media is as 
manifest as possible. The mass media is essential to conduct fair elections. A free and fair 
election is not only about casting a vote under proper conditions, but also about having 
adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself so 
that voters can make an informed choice. A legitimate election with no freedom of media 
would be a contradiction in terms. So, even in autocratic political systems, a pre-election 
setting provides a certain degree of liberalism in media.  The prime concern in pre-election 
atmosphere is the right of voters to full and accurate information. Parties and candidates 
are entitled to use the media to get their messages across the electorate. The media itself 
has a right to report freely and to scrutinize the whole election process. This scrutiny is 
itself an important additional safeguard against interference or corruption in the 
management of the election. Finally, the electoral management body has a crucial need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Davos vowing to never return after stating he only got 12 minutes but Peres got 25 minutes to speak. This 
incident has caused both positive and negative reactions in Turkey. 
6 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at the United Nations Durban Review Conference on Racism on April 20th, 
2009. While Ahmadinejad’s speech drew negative reactions worldwide, the speech generated positive 
coverage in Iran. Members of Iranian parliament issued a supportive joint statement alongside other 
congratulatory remarks, a Tehran city council member offered support for the speech, and several 
newspapers wrote favorable editorials, while some commentators from the general public on an Iranian 
newspaper website wished that Ahmadinejad would pay similar attention to domestic priorities. Delegates 
from twenty-three countries walked out of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech at the UN 
Durban Review Conference held in Geneva in response to his remarks.In the speech, Ahmadinejad said: 
“Following World War Two, [western powers] resorted to making an entire nation homeless on the pretext 
of Jewish suffering. They sent migrants from Europe, the United States and other parts of the world in order 
to establish a totally racist government in the occupied Palestine. In compensation for the dire consequences 
of racism in Europe, they helped bring to power the most cruel and repressive, racist regime in Palestine.” 
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communicate information to the electorate – and to a variety of other groups, including the 
political parties and the media itself7. 
Secondly, the two leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad share 
similar backgrounds: They both come from a conservative periphery8, they both 
administered municipal, local entities before becoming a national leader and they both are 
continuously criticized for applying populist approaches.  
In the nex section, the first part of the literature review examines the notion of leadership 
and how media and leaders interact. Then, the next part concentrates on how media 
portrays reality and in what ways it can oppose leaders. Thirdly, the conflictual 
relationship between center and periphery and how it is interpreted in post-modern 
conjuncture is illustrated by giving examples from Turkish and Iranian history.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 http://www.edb.utexas.edu/resources/team/Lesson_3.pdf  
8 Both Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were born and raised in suburbs. Ahmadinejad’s 
family moved from Iranian province to Tahran’s suburbs when he was four years old. Similarly, Erdogan’s 
family moved to Istanbul’s suburbs when he was thirteen. They were both raised  by religious families who 
had low incomes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  2.1 Leader and Media Conflicts 
When interpreting conflict-related information people use their cognitive processes. 
Referring to one’s cognitive values in analyzing others’ behaviors or values makes it 
difficult to take the other's perspective into consideration, therefore views of the other also 
appears to be self-centered. Parties in conflict tend to develop mirror images of the self and 
the other9.  They have tendencies to view themselves as the good side who struggles for 
their self-defense, while the other side is inherently evil. These attitudes eventually lead to 
further escalation.   
In international conflicts, existential fears about national survival and identity incite 
conflict escalation. It can also lead to extreme violence in the name of self-
defense. Leaders may manipulate mass group loyalty by emphasizing people's needs for 
security and self-transcendence, which highlights a strong attachment to conflict norms. 
Hence, tendencies for conciliation are labeled as weak and disloyal, or even as 
treasonous10. National or social leaders can manipulate common cognitive biases. These 
leaders have the opportunity to name a person, instance or even a whole country as a target 
                                                            
9 William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, “A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and 
Khrushchev”,  Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), p.325.  
10 David Lake and Donald Rothchild cited in Janice Gross Stein, in Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of 
Managing International Conflict, Crocker, A. Chester, Hampson, Fen Osler &Aall, Pamela (eds.), United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2001, p.190. 
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of hostility11. Additionally, they can manipulate enemy images in a way that these images 
self-fulfill and self- reinforce themselves. Conflict images are very resistant to 
disconfirmation.  Inconsistent information may be explained away in ways that reconfirm 
the original image12.  
On the other hand, national or social leaders might also have a positive effect on 
negotiation processes. For example, if leaders learn from failure they can be contributing to 
de-escalation. If failure challenges the status quo, it stimulates changes for solutions far 
more easily.  
In brief, as it is mentioned previously, leaders may affect the course of conflict in various 
ways. This study focuses on the conflict between leaders and media. In this research, in 
order to apprehend how and why leader and media conflict with each other, first, the 
definition of leadership is given. Then the areas in which these two actors face conflict are 
highlighted. In the last part, the characteristics of Turkish and Iranian media are 
enumerated for being able to evaluate the areas of conflicts through these cases.  
 
                                                            
11 Conflict Research Consortium Staff, Book Summary of The Funcitons of Social Conflict by Lewis Coser 
at http://www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10142/ . 
12 Leaders are important figures in effectuating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Self-fulfilling prophecy can be 
summarized as an initially wrong statement that alters actions and therefore comes true. Self-fulfilling 
prophecies occur when a party’s beliefs about their adversary cause them to act in ways that actually provoke 
the adversary's expected response. The adversaries provoked response is then taken as a confirmation of the 
party’s original expectation, and a vicious cycle evolves. Vicious cycles can also occur when the other party, 
who is unaware of our expectations, does nothing to disconfirm them, and so implicitly confirms worst 
expectations. People tend to break off interaction and communication with those they dislike. When this 
happens, people become stuck in autistic hostility, that is, their hostility is perpetuated by their refusal to 
communicate.  
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2.1.1 Leadership Types 
The topics of leadership and media effect are generally studied under the propaganda issue. 
The main study that elucidates these notions is  Gunther and Mughan’s Democracy and the 
Media13. However, the definition of leadership, media effect and propaganda are subject to 
various discussions. Leadership comprehends a wide range of roles that have a profound 
influence on the international system. This notion contains an ambiguity as it can be 
employed for various types of people in diverse contexts. As a matter of fact the subject of 
leadership appears to be one of the most observed and least understood phenomena in 
academia14.  The notion of leadership etymologically highlights conflictual relations: the 
root of the word is “leith”, meaning “to go forth and die”15. Consequently, a leader would 
be a person leading a group towards another in order to commit a violent act, thus, a person 
creating a conflict. Even if the committed act is not violent, a leader, basically, mobilizes a 
group to dominate another. In brief, leaders come into conflict because they lead in the 
interest of the part that they represent and eventually they will encounter other leaders 
defending the interest of their own group. Also, they may be confronted with their own 
groups because groups, by definition, do not constitute homogenous entities, thus represent 
diverse interests, some of which can clash with those of the leader. Such attitude compels 
“leadership” as an appealing subject of conflict studies.  
                                                            
13 See Shlomo Shpiro, “Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism”, Politics: 2002 Vol. 
22(2), pp.76-85 and Martin Staniland, “ The Rhetoric  of Centre- Periphery Relations”, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol.8, No.4 (Dec,1970), pp.617-636. 
14 J.M. Burns, Leadership, New York, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1978, p.2. 
15 John W. Gardner, On Leadership, New York, The Free Press, 1993. 
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There have been various efforts to examine the difficulty of both determining and 
predicting personality characteristics or traits of leaders and their associated effects on 
public policy, especially in social psychology literature. The findings of these studies 
demonstrate that most people illustrate an inconsistency in behavior across varied 
situations16. However, the greatest challenge this line of research faces, would be the 
inherently wide variation in personality types within the human population. As a result, in 
part, it is difficult to successfully predict behavior based on personality type.  This might 
lead us to concretize the belief that any criticism committed over a leader’s personality is 
actually directed to his roots with the social class that he is from. Good leadership is not 
based on personality type but more likely to be related to the identification with the social 
entity.  
 
In the political psychology literature, there is a well-developed body of research on the 
ways that individual leaders influence international politics. Hermann et al. argue that 
leadership style is one of the fundamental determinants of a state's foreign policy17. 
According to Hermann and others, variance in leaders’ personality structure is likely to 
affect how leaders use their political influence in distinct ways, especially in the realm of 
foreign policy. This generation of political psychology research typically leader typologies. 
One common category used to separate leaders is whether they seem to be more 
                                                            
16  For these studies, see D.Bem and D. Funder, “Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing 
the Personality of Situations”, Psychological Review, 85, 1978,pp .488-501;  J. D. Barber, The Presidential 
Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1992; Jerrold M. 
Post, The Psychological Assessment of Individual Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill 
Clinton, Ann Arbor,  University of Michigan Press, 2003. 
17 G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw. Who Leads Matters: The Effects 
of Powerful Individuals. International Studies Review, 2001, p.3.  
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ideological or more pragmatic in their approach to challenges. Another way to divide 
leaders is to compare those who are goal driven with those who seem more responsive or 
reactive to the events around them18.  
Likewise, Hermann et al. view several factors as critical when cataloging individual 
leaders: responsiveness to constraints, openness to new information, and solving problems 
versus developing relationships19. All these three categories also demonstrate how 
important media can be in leadership success. Media can reclaim constraints by 
maneuvering public opinion. Consequently, media contributes to the formation of 
constraints. Especially, in countries where political engagement is limited, the media can 
also act as an instrument to vocalize public needs.  Moreover, media being the source of 
information can be crucial for a leader’s right move.  As Hermann et al. suggest, the 
quality of a leader can be assessed also by evaluating his openness to new information. As 
this new information can be mainly sustained from the media, media plays a pivotal role 
for leader’s success. Moreover, media can monitor if the leader solves problems or 
develops relationships. The media announce the needs, the constraints that the public 
propounds. Likewise, media monitor if these needs were satisfied by the responsible. In 
other word media has the role to annunciate if public’s demand were met or not.  
Conflict studies broadly examine the notion of leadership by distinguishing between 
leaders who exacerbate and ameliorate conflicts. Various scholars generate diverse 
                                                            
18 Paul Humphreys and Dr. Ronan McIvor (eds.), Interorganizational Relationships and The Implications 
for Leadership and Organization Development, Bradford, Emerald Group Publishing, 2006, 
http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/search~S9?/aHumphreys/ahumphreys/1,38,58,E/l856~b1210904&FF=ahumphr
eys+paul&2,3,,1,0/indexsort=- . 
19Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters. Foreign 
Policy 100, 1998, p.127-135. 
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typologies in order to categorize leaders. As Barbara Kellerman indicates the first thing 
that appeals while examining the leadership literature is that there exists two major streams 
of leadership: corporate and administrative20. John W. Gardner develops the concept of 
"cross-boundary" leaders21, who are capable of working effectively at both levels22. 
Likewise, Peggy Dulany employs the term "bridging" leadership23, and gathers case 
studies from throughout the world documenting how leaders have effectively linked 
disparate, and often hostile, constituencies24. Additionally, William Ury highlights “third 
side leadership”, signifying a type of leadership that would be a “healing force between 
opposing sides”25. As these studies broadly indicate, research on leadership mainly focuses 
on evaluating the leader’s position while he interacts at various levels. However, in this 
research the main aim is to focus on the interaction itself: the confrontation between leader 
and media. The main aim is to gain a deeper understanding about how political leaders and 
media interact with each other when there is an incompatible goal between them. This 
assessment will be analyzed through centre-periphery confrontation because it is supposed 
that characteristics of center-periphery confrontations might provide us a deeper 
understanding.  
                                                            
20 Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership: What is it? How it happens? Why it matters?, Cambridge, 
Harvard Business School Press, 2004, p.233. 
21 Cross-boundary leadership necessitates an ability to perform at different levels in order to achieve a certain 
goal. For example, a leader should collaborate across boundaries with counterparts in other departments, 
organizations, and levels of government. 
22 John W. Gardner, On Leadership, op. cit.  
23 Bridging leadership is a style of leadership that focuses on creating and sustaining effective working 
relationships among diverse actors and stakeholders. By "bridging" different perspectives and opinions often 
found across the breadth of different stakeholders, a common agenda can begin to be developed and shared in 
order to find solutions to social and economic problems. 
24 http://www.alliancemagazine.org/online/html/aooct07a.html  
25 Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes, New York, Penguin, 1991, p.25.  
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2.1.1.1 Political Leadership and Media 
A political leader is one who occupies an established political position or any person, in or 
out of such a position, whose political activity has more influence upon a group’s behavior 
than the activity of the average member26. Leader and media come across each other in 
various grounds. According to one paradigm, the mass media are essentially dependent to a 
society’s institutionally dominant power-holders. Dominant power-holders’ opinions are 
regularly sought and their ideologies and interests are reinforced. On the other hand, 
according to a contradicting thesis, the mass media is itself that possess power. It’s the 
mass media who define and shape reality. Proponents of the first paradigm support that it is 
possible to control and manage information by direct and indirect involvement of media27. 
Adversely, partisans of the second thesis defend that media are “dominant institutions of 
contemporary society to which other institutions must conform”28. Both of these theses 
underline a conflictual relation between leader and media: In both cases, attempts to 
control the flow of information can be observed.  
Politicians need to be connected with the communication channels that are controlled by 
the mass media, consequently, politicians become obliged to adapt their messages to the 
formats and genres demanded by the media29. Likewise, journalists cannot perform their 
                                                            
26 Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman (eds), Political leadership for the new century (electronic resource). 
Imprint Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2002.p.9 
27 Steve Chibnall, Law and Order News, Routledge, 2003, p.13. 
28 Lawrence Schneider, “Book Review: Media Logic”, Journalism Quarterly; Autumn 80, Vol. 57 Issue 3, 
p.512 
29 Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980 
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duty of political examination without access to politicians for information30. Consequently, 
each side of the interaction offer each other access to a resource it values. However, there 
are views that neglect leaders’ dependency on media because they defend that media 
cannot be as influential as argued by others. According to this view, people are not blank 
sheets; they bring their identities to their reading of a newspaper.  For example, Chomsky 
rejects the view that media enables the public to control the political process by providing 
a pluralism of ideas, information and opinion. Chomsky indicates that the media monitors 
the limits of debate in ways that protect the state interests in society31.  
In brief, political leaders and media are interdependent to each other. Such interdependence 
might be considered a motivation to maintain a peaceful coexistence. However, literature 
illustrates various conflicts between political leaders and the media.  Root causes of these 
conflicts might be summarized as the continuous will of a political leader to control both 
economic factors and political structures in order to remain in power. The ultimate goal of 
a political leader is to remain in power32 . In addition to root causes, direct causes such as a 
sudden change in policy or an economic downturn might incite conflicts between political 
leaders and media. To summarize, political leaders and media clash with each other 
because of the incompatible goal of maintaining the power. However, the political leader, 
as the primary actor in this conflict, exposes offensive attitudes and behaviors. These 
attitudes and behaviors are natural and inherent to the notion of being a political leader. A 
                                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Note that there are some critics of the Chomsky’s position : Does Chomsky really demonstrate cohesive 
elite action, rather than assert it? Does he underestimate the autonomy of journalists, and their ability to resist 
pressures from owners such as Murdoch. (for example Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil succeded to resist 
Rupert Murdoch). 
32 Gabriel Almond, “The Study of Political Culture”, in Lane Crothers  and Charles Lockhart (eds), Culture 
and Politics, St. Martin’s Press, NY, 2000. P. 2-4. 
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political leader sees the media as a tool that can be utilized to secure or gain political 
influence33. “Reputation becomes even more important than in the past, and political 
struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility.”34 In the case of 
democracy, it is primarily the public that can grant credibility and legitimacy to a political 
actor. For political leaders, the media is an essential arena to win the hearts and minds of a 
target audience. A political leader enters into conflict with the media over the control of 
announcing who is good, who is bad. Likewise a political leader conflicts with the media 
over defining what is good and what is bad.  
  
 
2.2 Media, Public Opinion and Reality 
The mass media plays a crucial role for contemporary politics. In the transition to liberal 
democratic politics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the media was one of the 
fields of confrontation. Democratic politics places emphasis on the mass media as a site for 
democratic demand and the formation of “public opinion”35. The media is seen as a tool 
which empowers citizens, and as a force that can obligate government to change policies36. 
The media is not just neutral observers but is a political actor itself. Mass media can 
influence public opinions to how to view the world. Newspapers, radio, and television are 
                                                            
33Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 1997, pp. 56-58. 
34 Joseph Nye qtd. in Chester A. Crocker,Fen Osler Hampson,Pamela R. Aall (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of 
War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, United States Institue of Peace, Washington, DC, 2007, 
p. 395. 
35 William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes, Theodore Sasson, “Media Images and the Social 
Construction of Reality”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18 (1992), pp. 373-393 
36 Ibid.  
14 
 
usually the main links with the outer world. A reporter might be the only source of 
information about the development of a conflict37. How the reporter frames the conflict can 
create a bias so that the audience favor one party or one solution, over another. As a matter 
of fact, the media is crucial in presenting and explaining conflicts, as well as preventing 
them from escalating. Consequently, the filed conflict resolution is also interested in how 
to work with the media effectively38. 
The media can publicize the principles of human rights and other moral norms, and can act 
to enforce those norms by publicizing violations39. It can also focus public censure on hate 
groups40. It can publicize and support peace-keeping operations41. The media can act as a 
de facto messenger for parties who lack any other means of communication42. The media 
can educate the parties about each other's interests, needs, and core values, and help to 
confirm the parties’ claims of transparency43. Likewise, the media can help parties to 
denounce dehumanization of the other44.  The media can help educate the parties and 
public about existing conflict resolution resources, and about other successful cases of 
                                                            
37 Johan Galtung, "High Road, Low Road," 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/p07_highroad_lowroad.html. 
38 Loretta Hieber, "Media as Intervention", 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/p16_intervention.html. 
39 Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (eds.), Democracy and the Media. Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p. 404. 
40 Ibid. p.205. 
41 Gadi Wolfsfeld. Media and the Path to Peace, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.225-228. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Mehdi Semati, Media, Culture and Society in Iran,  New York, Routledge, 2007, p.5 
44 Loretta Hieber, op. cit.  
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conflict management45. The media may itself reframe the issues in ways which make the 
conflict more tractable. They may aid the parties in reframing issues, and in formulating 
possible solutions. The media may also help maintain a balance of power amongst political 
parties. Besides, mass media should essentially facilitate pluralist debate and the free 
formation of public opinion in what Jurgan Habermas calls the “public sphere46”.  
Stuart Hall has stresses the role of the media in reproducing ideology. He emphasizes that 
Thatcherism in Britain acquired hegemony in the eighties mainly by the dominance and 
control of the agenda by the tabloid press47. 
The media can also work to deflate rumors and propaganda. Propaganda appears to be the 
area where media and leadership research intersect. Propaganda is designed to manipulate 
others’ beliefs and induce action in the interest of the propagator by inculcating messages 
into the listeners’ minds. It involves the use of images, slogans and symbols to play on 
decisions and emotions. The ultimate goal of propaganda is to persuade the recipient of the 
message to come to voluntarily accept the propagandist’s position as if it was one's own. 
The term propaganda was first used in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV issued the Sacra 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide to counter the growing Protestant threat in order "to 
reconquer by spiritual arms" those areas "lost to the Church in the debacle of the sixteenth 
                                                            
45 Indigenous Conflict Management Mechanisms, 
http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/resourc
es/ghai/toolbox4.htm  
46 Jürgen Habermass, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, , The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1991, p. 305. 
47 Stuart Hall, “ Culture and Power” 
http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2190&editorial_id=10337  
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century.48" Henceforth, propaganda has become a common element of politics and war. As 
new communications technologies have evolved, propagandists have also developed new 
methods to reach increasingly large audiences in order to shape their views. Propaganda 
generally aims to construct a noble leader image to which individuals in the domestic 
population can feel connected. At the same time, propaganda often attempts to rally the 
domestic public to action creating fear, confusion, and hatred by portraying the antagonist 
as an abominable figure49. In brief, propaganda is usually employed to dehumanize the 
other50. Stereotyping and scapegoating are common tactics in this regard. In its modern 
usage, propaganda also tends to be characterized by some degree of institutionalization, 
mass distribution, and repetition of the message.  
 
Furthermore, media also possesses an agenda-setting function. The agenda-setting process 
can be considered as an inevitable effect of newsgathering by large organizations which 
constitute a large part of the mass media. McCombs and Shaw in their study, which is 
conducted in the United States during the 1968 presidential elections, explore the agenda 
setting function of the media51. A sample of floating voters was asked to plot the key issues 
of the election. Simultaneously, news from the mass media which focused on the election, 
were collected and their content was analyzed. The results showed a solid correlation 
between the two accounts of most important issues presented by news media at that time. 
                                                            
48Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell,  Propaganda and Persuasion,  California, Sage Publications, 
1999, p. 72-73. 
49 J.E. Combs, and D. Nimmo, The New Propaganda: The Dictatorship of Palaver in Contemporary 
Politics, New Yorki Longman, 1993 
50 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, op. cit. 
51M. McCombs, and D.L. Shaw, “The Agenda-setting Function of the Mass Media”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 73, 1972, pp.176-187. 
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“The evidence in this study that voters tend to share the media’s composite definition of 
what is important strongly suggests an agenda-setting function of the mass media”52.  
In brief, mass media plays a crucial role in forming and reflecting public opinion. As the 
media connects the world to individuals and reproduces the self-image of society, it has a 
strong social and cultural impact upon society. This is predicated upon its ability to reach a 
wide audience with a strong and influential message. Marshall McLuhan uses the phrase 
“the medium is the message” as a means of explaining how the distribution of a message 
can often be more important than content of the message itself53. The way and the time of 
presentation of the message might change the perception of the viewer or the reader. For 
example, how the media chooses to frame issues can result as the media acting as a catalyst 
either to escalation or de-escalation. It is through the persuasiveness of media such as 
television, radio and print media that messages reach their target audiences. In brief, media 
has been largely responsible for structuring people’s daily lives and routines54.   
All of these aspects of media prove to us that media have the capability to portray, 
manipulate and control reality. Media can inculcate what is right or socially reconstruct 
core values. Accordingly, contradicting values of center and periphery can also be 
observed through media.  For example, through newspapers those promote “right” attitudes 
and “right” moves of a leader, the previously mentioned contradiction gains momentum.  
 
                                                            
52 Ibid. 
53 Marshall McLuhan and Fiore Quentin,  The Medium is the Message, San Francisco, Hardwired, 1964 pp. 
8-9, 26-41. 
54 O’Reagan, “Australian Television Culture” in Robert Clyde Allen and Annette Hill, The Television 
Studies Reader, Routledge, NY, 2004, pp.79-80.  
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2.3 A Brief Look at Turkish and Iranian Media 
 
Certain similarities and differences between Turkish and Iranian media can be traced while 
analyzing their media characteristics. To begin with, the most important difference can be 
highlighted as tight restrictions over media in Iran. Iran is rated as “not free” by Freedom 
House Report 2009. This status can also be confirmed by the reports that Reporters sans 
Frontièrs provide55. On the other hand, Turkey is qualified as a “partly free” country by the 
very same report. This status can also be affirmed by the “Media-Watch Reports” 
presented by bianet56. The Ahmadinejad government had declared that the duty of the 
media is to report and support government actions, but not to comment on them. According 
to the Freedom House Report “fear of stepped-up penalties has reinforced a trend toward 
self-censorship and inhibited public criticism of the president”57. Islam has been the 
official religion of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The media is accountable to 
Islamic Law and heavily censored by the ruling religious clerics. The press cannot criticize 
government leaders who are also religious leaders. And other religious tenants must be 
upheld in social, cultural, and political arenas. Reformists desire freedom of association, 
freedom of the press, and a more open society; they believe that a free press means free 
people. Reformist publications are frequent targets of censorship, confiscation, suspension, 
fining, and banning58. Consequently, journalism in Iran can be considered as a dangerous 
profession, especially if an individual worked for a reformist publication or adhered to a 
journalistic ethic of truth regardless of personal fate, which could mean threats, arrest, 
                                                            
55 http://en.rsf.org/iran.html  
56 http://www.bianet.org/files/doc_files/000/000/106/original/biarapor_2009.html  
57 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=384&key=201&parent=19&report=79 . 
58 Ibid.  
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imprisonment with or without formal charges, accusation of espionage, isolation, or even 
torture, banning, murder, and execution59.  
In theory, Iran provides constitutional protection for the press, but the Press Law outlining 
the purpose and duties of the press shows the true limits put on journalists60. The Press 
Law details a long list of “don'ts” for journalists, preventing free publishing under threat of 
punishment, which is also detailed in the Law.61  
Iran's Press Law established the Committee for Suspension of the Press within the Ministry 
of Islamic Culture and Guidance. This Committee, dominated by reformists, monitors the 
press and brings charges. Any charge brought against a newspaper or a journalist is heard 
by the conservative-dominated Press Court. All Press Court hearings and trials are to be 
open to the public, but it would be misleading to state that this is the case in reality. Juries 
are mostly conservative and often ignored, dismissed early, or consulted after decisions are 
issued62. From April 2000 to mid-2002, the judges in the Press Court have been pressing 
charges against individuals and publications, and circumventing the Committee63.  
Censorship certainly occurs in the city, but it is self-censorship that is the largest concern 
in the provinces64. Provincial journalists are cautious. They do not have enough funds, and 
they have no modern printing operations. These small provincial papers have limited 
                                                            
59 Ibid. 
60 A. Bahrampour,. “”A comparative review on publication of the press after the Islamic Revolution”, 
Rasaneh Quarterly, Vol.14 No.4,  pp. 82-93,  2002. 
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circulations. Consequently the capability of these papers as a source of news for the 
population is limited. As a consequence provincial Iranians rely on international broadcast 
media such as the BBC, or Radio Free Europe for information.  
Between 1997 and 2001, reformist Mohammed Khatami's first term, "serial newspapers" 
became common. "Serial newspaper" is a term to explain a situation when the publication 
of a paper is closed down, and publishers reopen with the same staff and editorial stand but 
under a new title. Examples of such serials that include three or more publications are 
common.  In June 2002 the CPJ claimed that at least 52 newspapers and magazines have 
been closed between 1997 and 2001, despite President Khatami's reformist position on the 
press.  
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reports, the reformist point of 
view can still be heard in Iran , Kar-o Kargan, Aftab-e-Yazd, Etemaad , Hayat-e No , and 
Hambasteghi . However, the CPJ also states that many of these newspapers have softened 
in tone. They still argue for reform, but they no longer write about government officials or 
issues that could be perceived as national security. This leads us to consider that censorship 
has in a way succeeded.  
Mohammed Khatami, a moderate Shi’a cleric, can be considered as a reformist and seeks 
to offer Iranians more freedom in their daily lives: freedom of association, the press, 
expression, etc. During his mandate between 1997 and 2005, he tried to adapt liberal 
reforms. However, Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who came to power in 1989, 
a conservative committed to maintaining Islamic traditions and a conservative society, has 
the authority and opportunity to hinder Khatami's reform efforts, which include a more free 
press in Iran.  
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In 2002 the Islamic clerics ruling Iran held power over the media. In part democracy, in 
part theocracy, Iran's Constitution establishes three branches of government, including an 
elected president, parliament and the Supreme Leader. The constitution also offers the 
Supreme Leader, Khamenei, the ability to approve presidential and parliamentary 
candidates, and make judicial appoints. As a result Khamenei has maintained conservative 
courts that support his positions65.  
In Iran, media has a critical role in democratization in the absence of real political party.  
Since the post-1997 reform movement, the State has been omnipresent in the press66: 
Iranian communication is largely liberalized by privatization however the state is still 
reluctant to give up its ideological control over the media.  The post-revolutionary state in 
Iran began to restrict market-relations, confiscated major assets of the Iranian bourgeoisie 
and nationalized major aspects of Iran’s industry, including its communications system. 
Since the end of the war with Iraq, the process of ‘‘reconstruction’’ had started. In the 
frame of this process, market-driven development and economic policies have been key 
aims of the state. A continuous fall in crude oil prices after mid-1997 made the implication 
                                                            
65 As an example the “Harim incident” that was annotated by World Press Freedom Review can be 
emphasized:  According to the "World Press Freedom Review," on 8 March 2000, the conservative weekly 
Harim was accused of mocking and criticizing President Khatami. Khatami, who has no control of the 
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66 Mehdi Semati (ed.), Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic 
State, London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 
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of reformist economic policies impossible. Such fall in oil prices also resulted in reduced 
industrial capacity utilization, and led to massive workers’ layoffs67.  
The government’s privatization efforts were largely unsuccessful because the essential 
preconditions for such structural change—an open trading system, an effective regulatory 
framework, an active capital market, a competitive banking system, an impartial judiciary, 
and a predictable political environment for private investment—simply did not exist in 
Iran68. In addition, the closely-related social scourges of endemic corruption, high divorce 
rates, widespread drug addiction, child labor, younger-age prostitution, violent urban 
crimes, and increased underground economic activities69.  
This process has been contested by continuous popular protests. These protests caused 
further fragmentation of the ruling elites and intensification of internal factionalism as well 
as aggravating the dispute over state’s policies, implications of these policies and the very 
definition of the Islamic state.  
Iran and the Iranian revolution are usually presented as examples of conflict between 
tradition and modernity. The transfer of power to the new ruling body has been viewed as 
the revenge of ‘‘tradition on modernity70”. Modernization discourse considers the 
transformation of societies as a mechanical change from agricultural and primitive to 
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industrialized, urbanized and rational nation-states71. Such ‘‘development’’ did occur in 
Iran but it was accomplished by using the tools of despotism. The legacy of this 
‘‘tradition’’, despotism, has played a major role in the underdevelopment of the Iranian 
media. If the ‘‘western’’ history that Lerner had mentioned failed to repeat itself in Iran 
and much of the ‘‘developing’’ world, the history of Southern Europe provides some clues 
to the nature and development of the press in Iran. Much in like Southern Europe,72  the 
Iranian press developed as part of the world of literature and politics. Most press 
proprietors, from the constitutional revolution (1906-1911) to the present day, have been 
well known literary or political figures. That is to say, in Iran, there have not been any 
distinct figures as “journalists”. Figures from literary or political worlds used the tools of 
journalism to investigate and report events and issues. This shows us that the media in Iran, 
where political engagement is limited, are also functioning as political tools. 
 
Journalism has remained politically charged and a politicized profession and the level of 
state involvement and intervention (in terms of economic and political control) have been 
highly visible. Undoubtedly, and as Hallin and Mancini argue in their analysis of the 
Southern European media system, the strong presence of institutions of “ancien regime”, 
most notably the strong presence of monarchy and conservative religious institutions and 
ulema (religious leaders), have made the transition to ‘‘modernity’’ a long, difficult and 
conflictual process73.  
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The increased marginalization of the pre-capitalist mode of production, feudal and 
patriarchal relations, increased urbanization, literacy and the rapid spread of technological 
and organizational changes have all contributed to an eruption of new and dynamic 
energies and new forms of struggles74. Sections of the Iranian ruling elites have tried to 
accommodate changes by offering some form of re-evaluation and reassessment of the 
entanglement between ‘‘Islam’’ and ‘‘modernity’’, painfully trying to reconcile ‘‘Islam’’ 
with ‘‘democracy’’ and human rights. In the 1990s, and especially since the landslide 
victory of President Khatami in 1997, increasingly the word Iran has replaced Islam, nation 
(mellat) has replaced umma (community of faithful), and discourse of civil society has 
replaced the discourse of Westoxication75.  
Article 44 of the Constitution called for massive nationalization of all large-scale industries 
and specified a number of industries, including telecommunication and broadcasting. 
Likewise, Article 49 enabled the confiscation of thousands of private companies and the 
transfer of them to newly formed foundations (bonyads)76. 
However, the commitment to the breaking of monopolies that included telecommunication 
has been halted because it would have necessitated the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
unequivocal negation of its revolutionary claims and would have implied the formal 
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abandonment of its remaining popular base77. Nevertheless, the state has managed to show 
a good degree of commitment to make necessary changes in order to accommodate private 
capital and encouraging foreign investment. In 2004, the disputed Article 44 of the 
Constitution, which limited private ownership and had put radio and television, the post, 
telegraph and telephone services under the ‘‘state sector’’, was finally revised. Revision of 
Article 44 of the Constitution has removed the last ‘‘legal’’ barriers to privatization for the 
major industries in Iran, which includes the postal service and communications.  Such 
revision lifted the limitation of selling shares of major state-owned companies to the 
private sector.78 
The number of publications, including daily publications, has increased rapidly, despite the 
harsh economic realities of Iran and the political and legal barriers. The number of national 
television channels has also increased from two to six. During Khatami’s presidency alone, 
from 1997 to 2003, the number of telephone lines increased by 127 percent; the figures for 
rural areas have witnessed a similarly sharp increase by 144 percent. Access to mobile 
phones has seen one of the sharpest increases; from 135,219 in 1997 to 2.5 million in 2003, 
indicating an increase of 1,748 percent. While Iran is still lagging behind richer countries 
in the region, it has registered the biggest increase in usage of Internet in the region79. It 
should be obvious that in recent years Iran’s communication industry has emerged as one 
of the fastest growing economic sectors and in this process, the state has emerged as the 
dominant media capitalist. Privatization of the communication industry has been one of the 
key aspects of the recent economic plans but remains a contentious issue.  
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Terms such as ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’, ‘‘restricted’’ and ‘‘free’’, ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘market’’ 
have formed some of the most controversial pairings of categories in modern liberal 
societies. Success, progress and freedom in this narrative have been measured according to 
the degree of separation between these pairings and the increased ‘‘undermining’’ of the 
role of the state. It is in this context that certain normative assumptions about the nature of 
communication in the global South have resurfaced, which see the state as the main 
obstacle/problem in the development of media and as the main enemy of media freedom, 
and the market as the solution. Such arguments are echoed across the globe in what seems 
to be a new round of struggle for freedom of media. 
The Iranian media market does indeed reflect the broader picture of the Iranian political 
economy, which is marked by the presence of massive and large-scale state-owned 
corporations on the one hand, and the petty production and small enterprises on the other. 
It is deeply marked by a divide between some large state-owned companies on the one 
hand, and individual titles on the other. The most important player might be stated out as 
Kayhan, the biggest and one of the oldest publishers in Iran, which is under the control of 
the Supreme Leader and currently publishes 13 titles. Other daily publications include 
Kayhan International (published in English since 1959, claiming to be the oldest English 
paper in the country), Kayhan Arabia (published in Arabic since 1980), and the daily sport 
newspaper Kayhan Varzeshi. The firm also publishes Kayhan in Turkish, as well as a 
number of weekly and monthly publication that include the monthly Kayhan Farhangi 
(published since 1984), weekly Zan-e Rouz (Today’s Woman, published since 1964), bi-
monthly Kayhan Caricature (published since 1992), and weekly Kayhan Havaie 
(published primarily for Iranians living outside Iran). Since 1985 Kayhan also ventured 
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into publishing books after the creation of its book-publishing arm, Sazeman Entesharat 
Kayhan.  
The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), since its launch in 1998, has become one of 
the key newspapers in the country. IRNA publishes six other titles, some of which do 
compete with similar titles published by other firms including Iran Daily (the country’s 
third English newspaper), Iran Varzeshi (a daily that is part of a growing market in Iran 
specializing in sports news coverage), and Iran Javan (yet another title from a major player 
targeting a younger readership). In addition to these, IRNA also publishes the monthly Iran 
Azin (focusing on interior design), Iran-e Saal (which provides an annual report of Iran’s 
significant events), and Iran Sepid (the only publication in the Braille language in the 
region). 
 
Undoubtedly, in countries where historically the press has emerged as an agent of 
modernization, and where the process of ‘‘modernization’’ is top-down, the link between 
the state and the press is inevitable. The press is used to assimilate masses into 
modernization by the ruling elite. As a result of such legacy, in the newspaper market, the 
state has been a major competitor and in most cases the dominant player. A number of 
factors have contributed to the dominance of the state in this sector. In the first place, the 
economic realities of the press industry and the associated risks of producing a newspaper 
with no or little tradition of democracy is not an attractive prospect for the private sector. 
Heavy and expensive machinery, lack of proper distribution networks (roads, rails, etc.), 
and difficulties in producing viable and credible newspapers where there are no political 
and social accountability and transparency are a major turn-off for private investors. 
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To conclude, in Iran, much of the state’s political legitimacy rests on the state use of force 
as its ultimate sanction. The struggle to claim monopoly over the means of symbolic 
violence, namely the attempt to islamicize the media, however, has played a significant 
role, and in the current climate cannot be separated from the former. Nevertheless, there 
exists a visible opposition, units and policies, in addition to individual and institutional 
differences and interests. 
 
When we examine the Turkish press, it is clear that the press has continually played an 
important role in Turkish political, social and cultural life. The fact that the press was 
introduced to Turkish society in the mid-19th century, at a time when the country was 
facing intense political change both at home and in foreign affairs, helped to shape the role 
of the press80. During the same period, the Balkan Wars and the First World War also 
incited changes in the Turkish press. Through this frame, it can be stated that Turkish press 
taught Turkish public about the crucial role of the press that could play in communications, 
propaganda and organization. The Turkish press also played a critical role during the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic, as well as during the transition to a multi-party 
system81.   
The emergence of newspapers and print media in the later Ottoman Empire had a profound 
impact on sociocultural and political life. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, 
many restrictions on the press were lifted, and there followed a short-lived explosion of 
periodical publications. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the press 
became subject to the centralization as other institutions, and essentially it became an 
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81 Ibid.  
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organ of mass mobilization for the Republican People's Party. Hakimiyet-i Milliye 
(National sovereignty) in Ankara and Cumhuriyet (Republic) in Istanbul were left as the 
only national papers in 1925, and most regional papers were under government control by 
the time of a press law in 193182. By 1935 there were thirty-eight daily newspapers in the 
country (twenty-two in Istanbul, six in Izmir, and two in Ankara. With multiparty politics 
in 1946 came liberalizing measures, including less restrictive press laws, and the 
emergence of real mass circulation newspapers such as Vatan, Milliyet, and Hürriyet, 
which saw themselves less as instruments of political mobilization and more as means of 
information for citizens in a democratic system83. Under the Democrat Party a more liberal 
press law was passed, but by 1953 the ruling party tried to silence political opposition and 
the press, resorting to closures and jailing critics. The coup of 1960 was followed by a 
liberalization of the press, and journalists themselves drew up a Code of Ethics that was 
signed by all the major papers. These liberties were restricted after the coup of 1971, and 
again after that of 1980, but the public's expectation of an independent press was 
irreversible84. Through the 1990s Turkey was criticized by several human-rights 
organizations for imprisoning journalists. With the new legislation in line with European 
Union requirements, press restrictions have been lifted gradually and critical and 
investigative journalism has become characteristic of some newspapers. As a matter of 
fact, the total number of magazines which was 20 in 1990, reached 110 in 199985.  
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In Turkey, freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Constitution. According to the article 
28 of 1982 Constitution, it is not necessary to obtain permission or provide financial 
guarantees to establish a publishing house86. Freedom of the press can only be restricted 
for the purposes of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly 
classified as state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life 
of others or for protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or for ensuring the 
proper functioning of the judiciary. However, revision of the media law in 2002 meant 
that government control of the National Broadcasting Council (RTÜK) became tighter than 
ever87.   Journalists daring to criticize state institutions or touch taboo subjects, such as the 
Kurdish problem and the part played by the army in political life, are still censored, fined 
heavily and prosecuted without sufficient reason. 
Another aspect of Turkish press is its effectiveness for forming public opinion. It is an area 
that attracts the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the written press in Turkey is experiencing an 
important concentration problem. Although there are 21 newspapers at the national level, a 
significant portion of them are situated among a few groups. One of these is the Dogan 
Media Group. The Milliyet newspaper, founded by Ali Naci Karacan on 3 May 1950, 
transformed into a large publication group in the 1990s88. A total of 8 of the newspapers 
published nationwide belong to the Doğan Media Group. The Bilgin Media Group also has 
an important place in the Turkish press world with its newspapers, magazines and other 
partnerships within its structure. The İhlas Group is also another known media group with 
its newspaper, news agency and television both in the press and in other fields of activities.  
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After examining both Iranian and Turkish cases, common characteristics of the media 
systems in Iran and Turkey can be enumerated as low newspaper circulation, a tendency 
towards political instrumentation of the media, limited development of journalism as an 
autonomous profession and regulatory agencies. In both countries, “clientélism” based 
relationships coexist in a complex relationship with other forms of political formations. In 
general, in these two countries, journalism tends to accentuate commentary and 
newspapers to represent distinct political tendencies.  There is a strong tendency in both 
countries for media to be controlled by private interests with political alliances and 
ambitions which seek to use their media properties for political ends.  The instrumentation 
of the news media by oligarchs, industrialists, parties or the state implies a limited 
journalistic autonomy.  
Another characteristic which these two countries have in common is that clientelism 
accredits a pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is controlled 
by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support.  
On the other hand, the main difference between Turkish and Iranian press can be 
highlighted as the level of censorship. Developments in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan 
have increased the Iranian regime’s sense of insecurity and helped harden its repressive 
policies. The ruling clerics have tightened restrictions on freedom of expression and 
remain distrustful of broader political participation. According to Freedom House’s Map of 
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Freedom, Turkey is classified as “partly free” where Iran is named as a “not free” 
country89.  
 
Such characteristics illustrate us how media can function as a social resource of various 
political alignments. Thus, once again, it would be useful to connote that the conflict 
between center and periphery can be more profoundly comprehended through media 
analysis. Let us now conceptualize center and periphery conflict to better understand its 
effect on leader media clashes.  
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2.4 Center-Periphery Conflicts 
 
2.4.1 Center and Periphery 
Like media and leadership subject, the notion of “center- periphery” is also examined 
through paradigms of various disciplines. The terms center and periphery are frequently 
used to define geometrical position in space. Every center is defined towards its periphery. 
Departing from this geometrical definition, it can be stated that center is defined by a 
periphery that encompasses it and, likewise, the presence of a periphery necessitates a 
center. This geographical definition is also reflected on political understanding of a center-
periphery notion. In ancient Greece the geometrical center of the city is formed by the 
marketplace which is also a public space of decision making. In the medieval age the city’s 
center is occupied by religious functions as monasteries and churches, while the early 
twentieth century city center circulates around a central square with administrative 
buildings90.  
According to Shils, the center of society possesses an order of values, and thus, bears a 
control over the periphery91. Shils adds that center and periphery interact dynamically. The 
authority and influence of the central value system over the periphery deliberately change 
based on the proximity between peripheries and the center92. The center is a system of 
                                                            
90 Ayse Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," 
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values and beliefs, which reign society93. Moreover, Shils defends that moving away from 
the center towards the periphery weakens the attachment to the central value system94.   
Shils criticizes, in a way, a possible consolidation of a fix center-periphery image within 
the societies. He indicates that there has always been a degree of negotiation, which either 
leads towards rejection or affirmation of ideas. Frequent contacts between center and 
periphery foster mutual awareness and wider acceptance of the central value system, 
however, at the same time, such frequency also increases the extent of “dissensus” or 
“rejection of the central value system.95” In brief, the interaction between center and 
periphery is currently so high that there should not be a homogeneous set of values neither 
for center nor for periphery. An interacting set of values would obstruct distinctive center 
and periphery identities. 
 
 
2.4.2 Centralized Periphery and Marginalized Center 
 
Even though the role of center and periphery changes in the course of history, their 
representations remain in relationship to their spatial definitions. Recently, the terms 
“centralized periphery” and “marginalized center” were introduced in the literature and 
such an introduction fostered an emancipation of these terms from their geometrical place. 
The discourse on the “centralized periphery” indicates a shift of interest from the center to 
the periphery. The term, “centralized periphery” is employed to highlight a continuing 
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desire towards the center96.  This aspect of shift of axes can be observed both in Iran and in 
Turkey. The number of extremely wealthy families possessing holding companies in rural 
areas of Turkey has increased. These conservative nouveau-riches reclaim to be more 
visible and aim to adapt their values to the core of social-political structure. Likewise, in 
Iran, children of the Iranian Islamic Revolution are formed in a way to replace “elite” in 
Iranian institutions97.   
 
  
 
2.4.3 Center-Periphery Conflicts in Turkey and Iran: 
 
Historically, in Western cities, the spatial center operated as the arena of political discourse 
where sovereign power was displayed. Such operation generates the idea that the desire 
towards the center is a will of displaying power98.  At this point, it should be stated out that 
certain societies have stronger centers than others99.  Here, the Ottoman Empire and Iran 
emerge as interesting examples. In the Ottoman Empire, a long-lasting center was 
supported by a sophisticated network of institutions100. Attributing a distinctive 
characteristic to Turkish social-formation and its state is an approach widely used in 
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analyzing state-society relations in Turkey. It is emphasized that Turkish society shows 
significant differences from both Western social-formation and Islamic societies101.  
 
In Turkey, the modernist secularists representing the center define modernity as a mode of 
being free from all traditional and religious meanings. To be modern is defined as 
following specific rules, symbols, slogans, politics and cultural codes, all of which are 
defined by the secularist establishment. On the other hand, new periphery claims that the 
individual choice itself is the foundational principle of modernity. According to Serif 
Mardin the top-down, Jacobian model of Turkish modernization had always “collided with 
the moderate and conservative modernity of the ordinary Turkish people”102. This has 
created a deep tension between the elites and the people. For Mardin, the top-down 
analysis of Turkish modernization is damaged by a conflicting attitude of religion versus 
secularism, tradition versus modernity, empire versus nation, reason versus science, 
progressive enlightenment versus dogmatism. Mardin sees this reductionism as an essential 
function of the Kemalist ideology of nation building in the early decades of the 20th 
century. Nevertheless, he also links it to the “recent attempts to define a Turkish 
authenticity103” as a replay of secular nationalism. Replacing Muslim communitarianism 
with a secular nation-state identity, the founders of the modern Turkish Republic had 
hoped to change the “superstructure” of Turkish society104 and create a new “central value 
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system105”. Through this point of view, it can be stated that the new agents of 
modernization in Turkey are asserting the traditional parameters of power sharing. 
Traditional actors of the periphery are being empowered by new domestic debates about 
democracy as well as the new opportunities created by globalization. Periphery is 
empowered by a constant talk of democracy, identity claims, the European Union, civil 
society institutions, virtues of local governance. As a result, Turkey’s large periphery put 
pressure on the center for power sharing. However, it would be also problematic to 
nominate a conflict of power sharing between the elite and the masses, the upper class 
versus the lower class or the rich versus the poor. In both groups, rich and poor, educated 
and non-educated, young and old, men and women can be depicted. As a matter of fact, 
using the term center and periphery while analyzing the power sharing conflict, would be 
more compromising.  
 
Nevertheless, Mardin’s approach over center-periphery development in Turkey can be 
criticized through various points. The first point is that Mardin explains characteristics of 
Turkish social formation in relation to Western social developments. Such explanation 
refers to a relativist context106. As Turner indicates, “Orientalism set out to explain the 
progressive features of the Occident and the social stationariness of the Orient107.” He 
states that the eastern societies are seen as a deviant case since they were unable to develop 
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107 Bryan Turner,Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism,London, Routledge, 1994, p.22. 
38 
 
the institutions taken as the causes of Western dynamism and democracy. Hence, the East 
is defined by the absence of such institutions and the asserted lack of development108. 
 
According to Mardin, the basis of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation stands upon the 
absence of the factors that gave rise to the development of a civil-society in the West. 
However, at this point, it appears that Mardin’s definition of the Ottoman-Turkish social 
formation is related to his conceptualization of Western development. The role of cities in 
the rise of capitalism in the West is highly debatable109. However, Mardin claims that the 
creation of the modern state included “a series of confrontations leading to compromises 
with what may be called the forces of periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers 
and later, industrial labour110.” The autonomy of the periphery was also protected in the 
West which allowed an integrated structure.  
 
Mardin states that centre and periphery can be used as key concepts in explaining Turkish 
politics. According to Mardin, every “society has a centre”111. Various conflicts between 
centre and periphery took place in the process of centralization. The consequences of these 
conflicts played an important role in the formation of Turkish political structures and 
cultures112.  
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For Mardin, centre and periphery were two related worlds. “No attempt was made for a 
more complete integration when loose ties proved workable.113” The main connections 
between the centre and periphery were religious institutions, the judicial system and the 
tradition of public works. The modernization process incited periphery to move away from 
the centre. The peripheral forces defined themselves with religious rituals and identities. 
Technological developments and innovations led to better penetration of the centre into the 
periphery, however the vice-versa, the control of the centre by the periphery was never 
seen114. For Mardin, the centre-periphery duality remained the basic duality in the 
Republican period. The duality of Turkish politics is claimed to be between the leader and 
the masses, between public and leaders who do not want to share power between them. 
These basic dualities continue to shape the Turkish political structure115.  
 
The Ottoman legacy was inherited by the new Turkish state. Since the basic gap was 
between a dominant centre and a fragmented periphery, Turkish politics “lacked a tradition 
of multiple confrontations as a way of resolving conflicts116.”  Similar arguments and 
analyses can also be applied to Iranian modernization. Iran has always been a multi-ethnic 
and multicultural country117. Local politics have been neglected even after the 1979 
revolution, which was in a sense a populist revolt against the Westernized elite. 
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Centralized state building efforts were initiated during the Reza Shah Pahlavi era118. This 
centralization incited Tehran to dominate Iran’s political, commercial and cultural life119. 
Most of the westernized elites lived in the capital120. Reza Shah created an administrative 
system whose aim was to reach from the center as far as possible to the periphery121. This 
attitude created similar problems that Turkish modernization process has encountered: the 
Westernized, elite center and the conservative periphery had conflicting values. The efforts 
to assimilate periphery by inculcating western values escalated the conflict.  
 
 
2.5   Conclusion: The Parallels between Leader-Media and Center-Periphery 
Conflicts 
 
The literature review allows us to contemplate that studies on leadership mainly focus on 
leader’s position while s/he interacts at various levels. There is a lack of focus on the 
interaction itself and this study aims to focus on the interaction itself by analyzing the 
confrontation between leader and media. 
 
National or social leaders can manipulate common cognitive biases. These leaders may 
maneuver mass group loyalty by manipulating people's needs for security. Leader may 
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come into conflict with the media which would reveal and expose leaders’ manipulations. 
Especially, in countries where political engagement is limited, the media can act as a tool 
to vocalize public benefits. Likewise, the media can monitor if the leader solves problems 
or develops relationships. Mass media can influence public opinions on how to view the 
world. A reporter might be the only source of information about the development of a 
conflict. How the reporter frames the conflict can create bias so that the audience favor one 
party or one solution over another. As a matter of fact, the media is crucial in presenting 
and explaining conflicts, as well as preventing them from escalating.  
Likewise, media also possesses an agenda-setting function. The agenda-setting process 
appears to be an effect of newsgathering by large organizations which constitute a large 
part of the mass media. Similarly, mass media plays a crucial role in forming and reflecting 
public opinion. As the media connects the world to individuals and reproduces the self-
image of society, it has a strong social and cultural impact upon society. All of these 
aspects of media illustrates that media has the capability to portray and control reality. 
Media can socially reconstruct core values.  
Root causes of leader-media conflicts might be summarized as the continuous will of a 
political leader to remain in power. The literature on leader-media conflict demonstrates 
that good leadership is not based on personality type but more likely to be pertained to the 
identification with the social entity.  This might lead us to concretize the belief that any 
criticism committed over a leader’s personality is actually directed to his roots with the 
social class that he is from. This characteristic gives the idea that the conflict between 
center and periphery can be more profoundly comprehended through a media analysis. 
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The literature review reveals certain similarities and differences between Turkish and 
Iranian media. Common characteristics of the media systems in Iran and Turkey can be 
enumerated as low newspaper circulation, a tendency towards political instrumentation of 
the media, limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession and regulatory 
agencies. There is a strong tendency in both countries for media to be controlled by private 
interests with political alliances.  On the other hand, the main difference between Turkish 
and Iranian press can be highlighted as the level of censorship. The ruling clerics in Iran 
have augmented restrictions on freedom of expression.  
 
The literature on center-periphery relations indicates that the center of society possesses an 
order of values, and thus, manages a control over the periphery. Nevertheless, even if the 
frequent contacts between center and periphery foster mutual awareness and wider 
acceptance of the central value system, such frequency also increases the extent of 
“dissensus” or “rejection of the central value system”. Recently, the terms “centralized 
periphery” and “marginalized center” were introduced in the literature to explain the shifts 
in center-periphery dynamics. The discourse on the “centralized periphery” indicates a 
shift of interest from the center to the periphery. The term, “centralized periphery” is 
employed to highlight a continuing desire towards the center. 
 
To conclude, the conflict between the axis of center and periphery highlights a value 
conflict. As John Burton indicates, it would be harder to negotiate on value-related 
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issues122.  Value-related conflicts generally focus on relations between cultural groups123. 
In a value-related conflict negotiating is harder because positions, interests and needs of 
each party are based on cognitive notions. Parties have difficulties in defining a solid, 
concrete relation between each other; thus finding commonalities and conciliating both 
parties becomes harder and more complicated. So, while leader and media come into 
conflict over value-related issues, a deeper analysis of the debate might be necessary to 
highlight possible latent causes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLGY 
 
The aim of this paper is both to understand leader-media conflicts through examining 
center-periphery relations and trace possible parallelism between the courses of center-
periphery and leader-media confrontations. Thus, the main methodological effort is to 
conduct a discourse analysis by employing operational tools to detect similar patterns 
between previously indicated arenas of confrontations. This is a qualitative analysis which 
relates to the scrutiny of language, semiotics and conventions found in narrative and genre. 
In such a way, this study employs newspapers as sources of data in order to examine 
leader-media conflicts from a center-periphery perspective. The main reason to use 
newspapers is being able to categorize them according to their closeness to leader or to the 
opposition. The unit of analysis is newspaper columns and hard news which reflect 
newspapers’ values and positions in a social spectrum. It is through a newspaper’s columns 
and hard news that the reader can get news from the newspapers’ point of view.  
The data are collected after the archive search over the selected newspapers. Every sections 
of these newspapers were scanned in order to trace statements relevant to this study.  
Collected statements were marked according to the categories that appeared through 
literature review (control, style, right)124. These categories provided starting points and as 
the data analysis evolved new categories and sub-categories emerged. These new 
categories enabled providing a deeper understanding to leader-media confrontations. 
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During the data analysis, the objective was to elucidate how categories were linked to each 
other. After thoroughly analyzing possible aspects of leader-media and center-periphery 
conflicts the parallelism between these conflictual relations can be summarized under three 
categories: “Control”, “Style” and “Right”: 
 
Firstly, there is a continuous struggle between media and leader as well as between center 
and periphery over the domination of control. Media can criticize a leader for not being 
capable of keeping things under control. Such criticism might ignite a conflict with leader 
as it may lead to the fall of the leader. The leader may want to control media, thus, control 
the flow of information. Media can resist against this attempt. Similarly, both center and 
periphery enter in a conflict in order to influence and control social political formation of 
the society.  
 
Secondly, media comes into conflict with a leader over his style of handling problems or 
issues. Center and periphery emphasize contradicting life-styles and values. Actors in 
center and periphery try to influence each other.  
 
Last but not least, media and a leader can be currently in conflict over what is the right 
attitude, to handle internal or external problems.  Center and periphery confront each other 
to accustom their values to the core of political structure in order to define the “right”, the 
correct, the just attitudes according to their terms 
The newspapers are analyzed within their countries, and then a cross-analysis between 
Turkey and Iran had been carried out in order to find similar patterns. The relationship 
among categories had led to new directories and potential hypothesis.  As the research of 
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Miles and Hubermann125 suggest, I started with some general themes derived from 
literature review and added more themes and sub-themes as I progressed.  In order to help 
to unveil possible relations among categories I utilized the technique of memoing by 
continually writing down the thoughts that emerge through data analysis. 
Three newspapers from Turkey and three other from Iran are selected in order to collect 
data. Those six newspapers are selected by the consideration of their circulation numbers 
and their manifest positions in examined leader-media conflicts.  Circulation number is 
accepted to determine the remarks of how influential the newspaper is.  Data from Iranian 
media are amassed from Etemaad, Irna and Kayhan. Etemaad represents the center 
opposing the leader M. Ahmadinejad. Its affiliation with the Executive of Construction 
Party126 (Hezb-e Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi ) attests its manifest position. On the other 
hand, Kayhan represents the conservative periphery because its circulation is so high in the 
most poor and conservative regions of Iran127. Finally, Irna will represent a control group 
in this research being relatively neutral towards central and peripheral identifications.  All 
of these three choices are based upon Mehdi Sameti’s and BBC’s evaluations on the 
Iranian print media128. Likewise, Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet and Radikal are chosen from the 
Turkish press. Yeni Şafak represents the peripheral, leader-aligned media and Cumhuriyet 
exemplifies an opposition to the peripheral leader figure. Radikal is accepted as a control 
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unit trying to maintain equidistance towards the peripheral leader figure and the pro-
Kemalist center. The archives of Etemaad, Irna and Kayhan are examined applying a time 
limit between April 20, 2009 and April 27, 2009. April 20 is the date when Ahmadinejad 
gave his speech at the United Nations. Similarly the archives of Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet 
and Radikal are analyzed within a time interval starting from January 29, 2009 until 
February 05, 2009.  These periods are chosen because it has been seen that the reactions 
between media and leaders are condensed within these dates. After these dates, the subject 
over which leader and media interact changes.  
As case studies, Erdoğan ’s Davos talk and Ahmadinejad’s UN speech  have been selected. 
The main reason for choosing these two incidents is that both of them have occurred just 
before elections. Consequently, the press is accepted to function in a relatively braver and 
free mode. Selecting R.T.  Erdoğan  and M. Ahmadinejad is crucial because the similar 
background that they share lead to similar personal images that are possessed by their 
opposition media.  Both leaders are not inherently members of the center or the political 
elite but originally they come from the peripheries and they are both members of 
conservative families. They both have been “mayors” of metropolitan cities. They both had 
been members of non-political organizations. M. Ahmadinejad has linked with Pasdaran 
and R.T.  Erdoğan  has linkend with Iskenderpasa Convent. Furthermore, the label used for 
them by the opposition media is the same: Islamist/Populist. Last but not least, during the 
speeches both leaders were in a pre-election era. Both leaders targeted a common name as 
their “rival”: Israel and both of these targeting speeches had domestic impacts in return.  
As a matter of fact, this period leads to observe the effect of political culture in leader-
media conflicts more comprehensively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The three categories (Control, Style and Right), which were derived through literature 
review, provided starting points for performing an analysis on collected data. The analysis 
had enabled to develop other categories and sub-categories. In brief, I started with general 
themes acquired through literature review and built up more themes and sub-themes as I 
progressed. 
 
4.1 Turkish Case 
After the examination of Cumhuriyet, Yeni Şafak and Radikal newspapers between 
30.01.2009 and 07.02.2009, 91 news excerpts are drawn from Cumhuriyet, 68 from Yeni 
Şafak and 76 from Radikal.  
 
4.1.1 Control 
The term control signifies the struggle to be in charge and in control especially of the flow 
of information. In both Turkish and Iranian cases, political leaders aim to win the elections 
to be in charge of political power. They aim to require the media to not harm their chances 
of winning the elections. In such a way, the issue of control is directly linked with 
upcoming elections. The leaders are willing to remain in power and the media is inclined to 
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remain in the control of news-making process. Leader and media come into conflict when 
media publish news which would endanger the possibility of remaining in power for the 
leader.  
The conservative side has aimed to point out that the actions of Erdoğan  during the Davos 
summit were simply spontaneous, natural acts against cruelty. Furthermore, the actions of 
Erdoğan  have been considered as an attitude on behalf of whole Turkey.  Yeni Şafak 
continually emphasizes that Erdoğan was representing the whole country and how he was 
welcomed in Turkey by all layers of society.  Here we can recognize that the periphery 
unceasingly seeks for legitimacy for its existence and recognition. According to Yeni 
Safak, Erdoğan ’s reaction was nothing but a legitimate act purely done to express 
Turkey’s attitude towards the Gazze situation. The columnist, Fehmi Koru, repetitively 
underlines that this act cannot be considered as a trick to augment the party’s votes for 
coming elections because the vast majority in Turkey wanted Erdoğan  to react in such a 
way129. Likewise, several surveys that highlight the acknowledgement for Erdoğan ’s 
actions in Davos summit are published in the newspaper130.  Numerically, by percentages, 
the massive support stemming from all parts of society for Erdoğan has been accentuated 
by Yeni Şafak.   
On the other hand, the first thing that Cumhuriyet accentuates is that Erdoğan  possesses 
the ambition to be the “single man in command131” and that Davos was the clearest 
example of this ambition. Throughout history Ataturk was the only individual to have the 
right to be the “single man” and now Erdoğan  was trying to monopolize “power” under 
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his “control” in order to “demolish the values” that the only rightful single-man, Ataturk, 
developed. The fact that Erdoğan  neglected his advisors and diplomats’ suggestions 
during the Davos summit indicates his plans to take the ultimate control. Likewise, 
Erdoğan’s reactions have been interpreted as a play for augmenting support just before the 
elections.  
Lastly, when we look at Radikal, we see that it both criticizes and glorifies Erdoğan ’s 
actions in Davos. However, when Erdoğan  blames media for relating the Davos incident 
with elections, Radikal increases the tone of criticism by highlighting a possible inclination 
of Erdoğan  to put pressure on media.  
 
4.1.1.1 Legitimacy: 
 
In this study the title “legitimacy” represents the constant search of popular acceptance of 
an authority.  Through this understanding, both in Yeni Şafak and Cumhuriyet, the views 
of experts of news from the international press are presented in order to acknowledge or 
negate Erdoğan ’s actions. By highlighting international support or criticism, media aims to 
validate Erdoğan ’s reminiscence in power or negate Erdoğan ’s representation of Turkey 
in the international arena.  
First, when we look at conservative periphery, it can be seen that Yeni Şafak has 
accentuated reactions from the Muslim countries (such as Iran, Egypt, Jordan, etc.). 
According to Yeni Safak, the actions of Erdoğan  have been emphasized as an act of 
51 
 
representation of the oppressed majority132. Such upheaval was possible since now, with 
Erdoğan , the majority which has been neglected for ages by the minority that administered 
the foreign policies, finally found a way to get heard in the international arena. The true 
voice of Turkey was finally heard. To illustrate the situation, Tamer Korkmaz gives an 
example from an Ömer Seyfettin story called  “the caftan with pink pearls”133.  The story is 
glorified as being embedded in the minds of all Turks, “regardless of social strata”134. In 
brief, the periphery clearly feels the need to express that the leader is representative of 
whole Turkey, not just the party.  
On the contrary, the statements in Cumhuriyet expose that exhibiting a showdown over the 
Palestinian conflict is in a way a signal of the will to Islamize Turkey.  The act of being the 
porte-parole of Muslim “brothers and sisters” in Gaza, Palestine was de facto acting as a 
Caliph.   
On the other hand, as the word “Caliph” had been articulated in the conservative 
newspapers, two days after the Davos incident, Cumhuriyet accentuates the “sly”, “subtle” 
                                                            
132 Salif Tuna in Yeni Şafak, 02.01.2009.  
133 The story is about Muhsin Çelebi who was introduced to the reader as an “honorable” gentleman who had 
“little regard for bureaucratic chores” and stayed clear of hypocritical government regularity all his life. He is 
summoned by the grand vizier to carry a letter from the sultan to Shah Ismail of Persia, who is known to be 
extremely disrespectful and belitteling towards emissaries coming from Istanbul. He put all his estates as 
collateral to purchase the most precious caftan, an overcoat, completely embroidered with precious pink 
pearls. When he entered Shah Ismail's palace, his outfit attracted the attention of the courtiers as well as the 
shah himself. When Shah Ismail, on his throne, did not show Muhsin Çelebi a place to sit during the 
audience, the sultan's emissary laid down his caftan on the floor and sat on it. After a short discussion with 
the shah and delivering the sultan's letter, Muhsin Çelebi exited the court leaving his caftan with precious 
pink pearls behind, and when he was reminded to get it, he said a Turk could not put on his caftan after 
having sat on it. 
134 Tamer Korkmaz in Yeni Safak, 02 February 2009. 
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plans of Islamist entities even more135. Furthermore, as a search of international legitimacy 
for their thoughts, Cumhuriyet has put the stress on negative reactions from the Jewish 
lobbies either in Europe or in the United States. There was also the legitimacy issue while 
questioning whether Erdoğan ’s actions were representing the majority of Turkey’s 
citizens’ feelings.   
 
Moreover, Cumhuriyet highlights Davos incident as a part of taqiyya136 and hypocritical 
plays of AKP and nominates this incident as a play pre-planned in order to increase the 
votes. On the 30th of January, as Erdoğan  returns to Turkey, he denies the interpretation of 
Davos a plan to increase votes of AKP and blames certain media to fabricate false 
claims137. At this point, Cumhuriyet reciprocates intensively underlining that Erdoğan , the 
leader, intend to take control over the media. As a result, Cumhuriyet questions Erdoğan ’s 
legitimacy as a leader as he has tried to take control over the media. Cumhuriyet defends 
that Erdoğan ’s attempts to take media under control are the signs of his will to act as a 
tyrannical commander138. Cumhuriyet questioned Erdoğan ’s legitimacy by denying his 
capability of being a leader. The very first statements that have appeared in Cumhuriyet 
about Erdoğan ’s attitude at Davos underlined how “out-of-date” these actions were. There 
have been several recommendations to Erdoğan  about how to react on the international 
platform. The most popular advice for him was to read Lausanne Memoires and figure out 
                                                            
135 Ümit Zileli in Cumhuriyet 05.02.2009.  
136 Taqiyya is a religious permit for Muslims, mentioned in the 106th verse of An-Nahl sura, allowing them to 
conceal their faith when under threat, persecution or compulsion.  
137 http://www.trt.net.tr/haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=ae5750f4-f892-4af2-8e1b-2f81b5c900e9. 
138 Erol Manisalı in Cumhuriyet 02.02.2009, Orhan Bursalı in Cumhuriyet 03.02.2009. 
53 
 
how to act as a “civilized” diplomat139.  Cumhuriyet has indicated that a leader should have 
known the codes of Davos and should have acted upon according to such rules; otherwise 
if a leader does not have any idea about those codes or rules, he does not belong there. 
Such statements were clearly accusing Erdoğan  of being incapable to be a leader. 
Finally, Radikal, on the other hand, does not provide any comment that questions Erdoğan 
’s legitimacy as a leader. Even if Erdoğan ’s style is criticized by some columnists such as 
Altan Öymen140, these criticisms do not relate with comments which questions if Erdoğan 
’s should represent Turkey, especially in the international arena. These criticisms mainly 
focus on the leader’s style. 
 
  
4.1.1.2 Status quo: 
Another notion that leader-aligned media and opposition media conflict with each other is 
about the status quo.  Status quo, in this study stands for the position regarding the current 
existing state of political affairs. The position that defends status quo underlines a will to 
maintain the political dynamics as they are. While Yeni Şafak defends the necessity of a 
change in status quo that had kept Turkey incapable of utilizing its full potential, 
Cumhuriyet punctuates that a “different and dangerous kind of mentality141” is taking over 
Turkey’s administration. 
                                                            
139 Erdal Atabek in Cumhuriyet 02.02.2009.  
140 Altan Öymen in Radikal, 31.01.2009.  
141 Ümit Zileli in Cumhuriyet, 05.02.2009.  
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In this part, the term status quo is utilized as defending the current state and position of 
political and social affairs. While examining the articles collected from columns and hard 
news from selected newspapers, we realize that the periphery expresses a necessity to 
change Turkish foreign policy dynamics; on the other hand the center accentuates the 
importance of clinging to the position that has been assimilated since the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic.  
To begin with, Yeni Şafak has characterized the leader “Erdoğan ” as a “hero” blessed by 
holy mightiness142. The term hero has always been linked with religious connotations such 
as blessed or canonized. A leader has been able to reach the statute of being a hero by his 
piousness because the subject was being able to resist and revolt against cruelty committed 
towards innocent Muslim brothers and sisters. So, the idea is to embrace piousness in order 
to progress into further success in the international arena that Turkey has never 
experienced before.  
Adversely, Cumhuriyet has highlighted a dangerous shift in foreign policy that would alert 
a dramatic and dangerous change in Turkey’s position. Cumhuriyet has defended that it is 
crucial for Turkey to maintain its neutral position in the international arena rather than 
taking sides. Likewise, the statements disclose that Erdoğan ’s attitude was “wrong” 
because it will most probably lead Turkey to lose Jewish lobby’s support in the Armenian 
Genocide issue.  Moreover, Cumhuriyet blames Erdoğan  for losing USA’s support for 
several critical issues. In brief, Cumhuriyet castigates Erdoğan ’s behaviors also for 
                                                            
142 Yeni Şafak, 01.01.2009. 
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damaging the status quo. Consequently, the countries who welcome Erdoğan ’s actions in 
Davos are labeled as only being “third world countries”143. 
Lastly, Radikal, as the control group, does not provide any data that signal a criticism or 
appreciation of a change in Turkey’s position in the international arena. The columnists do 
not discuss whether the status quo in foreign or internal policies have changed. 
 
4.1.1.3 Trauma: 
The notion trauma indicates a psychological trauma that occurred as a result of a traumatic 
event. Through this perspective, a point that has been emphasized by Yeni Şafak is the 
possibility of a coup d’état which could be initiated by Israel.  Now that the periphery has 
the control of political dynamics, it feels threatened by being run over by “external 
forces”144.  At this point, a “trauma of coup d’état” or a “trauma of 28th February145” could 
be stated. At the monthly meeting of the National Security Council on 28 February 1997, 
the military presented the government with a list of 18 measures to restrain Islamic activity 
                                                            
143 Hikmet Çetinkaya, Cumhuriyet, 03.02.2009. 
144 İbrahim Karagül in Yeni Şafak, 03.02.2009.  
145 At the top of  the measures  that National Security Council undertook on 27 February 1997, there was a 
proposal to extend compulsory continuous education from five to eight years. The aim was to shut down the 
middle school sections of Imam Hatip schools. According to the military these Imam Hatip schools were 
used to inculcate anti-secularist values. Although Erbakan (the head of the islamist “Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi)”, that was a member of a coalition government at that time) initially agreed to the measures, party 
officials admitted that implementing these measures would alienate the party’s grassroots. The military 
continually augmented the pressure by encouraging NGOs to manifest against government as well as holding 
series of public meetings to warn about the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the military did 
not abstain from informing journalists that a “full-blooded” coup remained as an option of last resort. As a 
result of the forceful public pressure and erosion of coalition’s parliamentary majority because of 
resignations from the True Path Party (center right party, coalition partner) Erbakan resigned from prime 
ministership on 18th June 1997. 
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such as: restrictions on the Islamist media, the closure of Koranic schools and courses, and 
so on.  
On the other side, when Cumhuriyet’s statements are examined their trauma might be 
pointed out as early upheavals in the Turkish Republican history. Just after the declaration 
of Republic and the abolition of caliphate, there have been several religious risings aiming 
to bring down the secular republican regime. This fear has been put out when Yeni Şafak 
has earnestly accentuated Turkey’s obligation to respect Ottoman legacy and try to “return 
to its origins”146. The right move is described as leaving the current understanding of 
diplomacy that holds Turkey in fitna147 and disturbances and respecting and evaluating 
Ottoman legacy that has been neglected since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.  
Ottoman Empire has been known as the alternative power of its time and Turkey should 
follow this example. 
Finally, Radikal, once again, does not present any data that underline an historical event 
which would cause a trauma. None of the excerpts from Radikal has indicated previously 
mentioned historical event.  
To sum up, under the issue of “control” the leader-media conflict through center-periphery 
paradigm can be summarized around three extents: First, the periphery does not want to 
lose control of political dynamics that it had earned recently and continually seeks for 
legitimacy.  Likewise, it has a constant fear of being overthrown by the military. 
Consequently, the data analysis allowed us to highlight a sub-category of “status-quo”. The 
                                                            
146 Yeni Şafak, 31.01.2009. 
147 Fitna is an Arabic word meaning secession and upheaval. It is usually used by referring to the first civil 
war within the Islamic Caliphate that took between 656 and 661. This civil war broke the unity of the Muslim 
ummah and resulted in division of Islam between Shi’a and Sunni sects. 
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analysis of leader-media conflict after the Davos incident, enabled us to become aware of a 
struggle between center and periphery about whether to preserve the status quo in domestic 
and international policies or not. 
Radikal aims to reflect views from both sides. This can be affirmed by the number of 
statements that criticize and acknowledge Erdoğan ’s style during the Davos summit.  
However, the collected data illustrate that Radikal has possessed a certain degree of 
inclination towards center’s approach about periphery’s willing to take a control over 
media. Nonetheless, the reason for such inclination might be shown as Erdoğan ’s blaming 
over the media for fabricating false news. Right after Erdoğan ’s return to Turkey, there 
have been several news accentuating that the showdown at Davos and welcoming by 
masses at Istanbul were all pre-planned.  
The importance of Radikal for these arguments is that it reveals the dialectic conflict 
between center and periphery by demonstrating other approaches. For example, the Peace 
and Democracy Party148 has a different interpretation about Erdoğan ’s attitude at Davos; 
their views that had been exposed via Radikal make us understand that Cumhuriyet and 
Yeni Şafak incite each other by acting upon center-periphery dynamics. BDP did not 
comment whether Erdoğan’s actions were “civilized” or not but underlined the necessity to 
be direct also in internal politics.  
 
 
                                                            
148 Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP). BDP is a political party that was established in 2008, after the launch 
of the closure case of  Democratic Society Party (DTP) because of its alleged connections with PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a separatist organization which is listed as  a terrorist organization) . 
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4.1.2. Style 
In this section the term style is considered as the way of utilizing communication assets. 
The category style allows us to analyze criticisms that evaluate the leader’s way of acting, 
especially in international arena.  Comments about Erdoğan ’s style of expressing his 
discontentment have been linked with “westernization” discussions. Erdoğan ’s actions 
were either “not civilized” or “an example of a true Turkish leader”.  As the comments 
from Cumhuriyet and Yeni Şafak are compared, another subcategory emerges under style 
caption: center and periphery conflict progress parallel to a conflict between materialism 
and spirituality. Here we observe periphery’s objection to distant, ruse diplomatic games 
and praising “honourable”, “dignified” showdowns. On the other hand, Cumhuriyet 
criticized the style of Erdoğan  as “unsophisticated” and out-of date in today’s complex 
world.  
 
 
4.1.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality 
The title of materialism vs. spirituality emphasizes the difference on whether evaluating 
somebody’s actions by basing on spiritual, religious values or pragmatic parameters. 
First, while examining the periphery reactions over the style of Erdoğan ’s disposition at 
Davos, two phases emerge: First the actions of Erdoğan  have been tried to be justified. 
The rightfulness of Erdoğan ’s “storm-out” has been accentuated by enumerating several 
reasons to behave in such manner. The stress has been put on “agitation” and “incitation” 
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committed by Simon Peres149. Then, the next phase is to glorify the attitude: the emphasis 
has been put on how “honourable” and “dignified” the action was150. As it can be 
perceived by the chosen adjectives that have been employed to approve Erdoğan ’s 
gestures, a new sentimental approach to materialist diplomacy has been adorned. 
Furthermore, according to the statements in Yeni Safak, Erdoğan  has exerted a new 
technique: It has been stated that by such a “showdown” Erdoğan  brought parties much 
closer to “solution”151.  It has been stated seven times that such a “showdown” was in a 
way the missing link for the necessary leadership that would lead to solutions.  It is 
continually declared that leadership necessitates such “manifest confrontations”152.  
Moreover, such new attitude in diplomacy should be celebrated as “losing the masks153” 
and “denunciation of mumming154” and finally adapting a limpid, transparent democracy. 
The best style to handle conflicts is emphasized as being direct and sincere.   
On the other hand, Cumhuriyet has criticized Erdoğan  for acting as a typical “Eastern 
politician” thus giving a “wrong” message to the international community about Turkey155. 
Erdoğan ’s Davos attitudes have been entitled also as a “new Ahmadinejad incident156”.  
Three days after the the Davos showdown, periphery side highlights the charisma of 
Erdoğan  and as reciprocation Cumhuriyet implies that periphery has no idea what to value 
in order to be successful in the international arena. They blame chasing cheap “charisma” 
                                                            
149 Tamer Korkmaz, Abdullah Muradoğlu in Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009. 
150 http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=02.02.2009&c=12&i=166686.  
151 Abdullah Muradoğlu in Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009.  
152 Ibid.  
153 Yusuf Kaplan in Yeni Şafak, 02.02.2009. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Cüneyt Arcayürek in Cumhuriyet, 31.02.2009.  
156 Cumhuriyet, 01.02.2009 and 02.02.2009. 
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rather than wisdom157. The periphery is also blamed for being out of date because 
according to Cumhuriyet, glorifying the term charisma, has been only cherished during the 
30s and 40s which had led to a disastrous Second World War experience.  Erdoğan  is also 
accused for effectuating a line of policy without any principles. Erdoğan  is pursuing 
“Kasimpasa Model158” of policy and this degrades Turkey’s credibility159.   
Lastly, in Radikal, one can see news and columns that cherish160 and that reprove161 
Erdoğan ’s style of acting in Davos.  
 
 
4.1.2.2 Individualistic vs. Collectivist Culture 
Individualism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the interests of the 
individual. Individualists view themselves as independent and slightly connected to the 
groups of which they are a part of162. When establishing a level of their commitment to 
others, individualists balance the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a 
relationship; the level of commitment generally correlates with the level of perceived 
benefit163. The term “individualism” was first used by Alexis de Tocqueville in his leading-
                                                            
157 Nigün Cerrahoğlu in Cumhuriyet, 31.02.2009. 
158 The term “Kasımpaşa Model” is employed by Center to accentuate Erdogan’s “vulgar” style of handling 
conflicts. Erdogan being raised in Kasımpaşa, a faubourg in Istanbul, utilizes “uncivilized” codes of this 
negihbourhood also as a Prime Minister.  
159 Hikmet Çetinkaya, 03.02.2009.  
160 Hasan Celal Güzel, Radikal, 01.02.2009  and Namık Kemal Zeybek, Radikal, 31.01.2009.  
161 Türker Alkan, Radikal, 31.01. 2009 and Halık Şahin, Radikal, 31.01.2009.   
162 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p.261. 
163 Ibid. p.260. 
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edge work Democracy in America. Since then, individualism and its presumed antithesis, 
collectivism, have been the focus of many studies. Individualists generally hold that 
humans are fundamentally atomistic, and that they voluntarily join groups to further their 
own goals. The good of a group can only be an aggregate of the good of individuals.  
According to individualistic perspective, reason is the source of all knowledge. 
Consequently, individualists believe that emotions are programmed by subconscious 
rational processes that can be consciously reprogrammed when necessary. Self-reliance 
and competitiveness can be pointed out as main individualistic characteristics. When 
personal goals conflict with group goals, individualists tend to give priority to their 
personal goals164. In brief, through the lenses of individualistic culture, a leader should 
emphasize ambiguity in language use in order to help ensure that a conflict does not “get 
out of control.” Likewise, for the leader maintaining emotional calm and reserve in style is 
crucial. 
 
On the other hand, collectivism is a social pattern that places the highest value on the 
interests of the group165. Collectivists view themselves as interdependent and closely 
linked to one or more groups166. Maintaining a commitment to a group is always important, 
even when obligations to the group are personally disadvantageous. Norms, obligations 
and duties to groups are collectivist societies’ members’ primary concerns, and they tend to 
place a high value on group harmony and solidarity167. Respect and cooperation are main 
                                                            
164 Harry C. Triandis, Culture and Social Behavior, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1994, p.12 
165 Ibid. p.34-35 
166 Ibid. p.43-44. 
167 Ibid. 
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collectivistic values. When personal goals conflict with group norms, collectivists tend to 
conform to group norms168. Collectivists also consider emotion and intuition to be sources 
of knowledge above and beyond reason, emerging from some instinctive, non-rational 
source. In brief, collectivist understanding can be considered as fostering a style that uses 
an indirect language, with more emotion shown during conflict. The credibility of each 
party in the dispute is gauged by how emotionally expressive and intense they are. 
 
Consequently, differences at validating spirituality or materialism might be linked to 
different set of values between individualistic and collectivist societies. Center, advocating 
for the obligation to be aligned with the “West”, appreciates individualistic traits. On 
contrary, periphery, questioning the necessity of trying to be “Westernized” by unnaturing 
social structure, de facto supports a collectivist set of values. 
 
The definition of culture should also be presented in order to be able to locate the subject 
of individualistic and collectivist culture in this research’s context. Even though there is 
not a unique definition of culture, it can be put out as the practices and the values common 
to a population living in a given setting169. Culture is not a stable, fixed fact; it is malleable. 
It changes to relate to the symbolic dimension of life. New concepts and symbols emerging 
in daily life effect culture. What is meaningful; what is important? Who we are in relation 
to the others? The answers of all these questions are culturally determined. Culture helps to 
encode the messages that shape our perceptions, attributions, judgments, and ideas of self 
                                                            
168 Geert Hofstede, op. cit., p. 250-251 
169 Marc Howard Ross, The Management of Conflict : Interpretations and Interests in Comparative 
Perspective,  New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 20-24 
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and other170. Hence, cultures can incite conflicts. Culture might be considered as a fixed 
factor in conflict. Whether it plays a central role or influences it latently, culture is always 
present in the course of conflict. Through this perspective, when acknowledging or 
negating leader’s style, parties are dependent on their cultural codes.  
 
In brief, peripheries support for negating ruse diplomatic tactics and affirming a struggle 
for “Islamic community” might be linked to their cultural traits that favor collectivist 
approach. On the other hand, center’s position that defends the obligation to favor nation’s 
benefits instead of Islamic community might be connected with their link to individualistic 
culture. Likewise, center evaluates leader’s actions by basing on pragmatic measures in 
order to calculate benefits and losses. This attitude might also be considered as an effect of 
the individualistic culture. 
 
Last but not least, another aspect under the style section is that the periphery insistently 
looks for legitimacy for Erdoğan’s actions. This search for legitimacy is similar to the 
search presented in the Control section.  There have been four different communications 
that illustrate the support for “how” Erdoğan  reacted. Affirming reactions that 
acknowledge Erdgoan’s style of handling the conflict, from the opposition parties 
(CHP,MHP,DSP), from the Jewish community in the United States, from famous artists, 
from various parts of the society are repetitively conveyed to readers.  
 
                                                            
170 Theodore Shwartz, Geoffrey M. White, Catherine A. Lutz (eds.), New Directions in Psychological 
Anthroplogy, NY, Cambridge University Pres,1992, p.17. 
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4.1.3 Right 
The “right” category utilizes the term right both as being “morally right” and “factually 
correct”. The first statements could be put under style and control titles, however as the 
discussion and analysis have gotten deeper, the subjects were linked with questioning what 
is morally right or factually correct. Both, Yeni Şafak and Cumhuriyet have started by 
commenting on Erdoğan ’s style of acting but as the days go by the statements have 
reflected an evaluation about vision and values. 
To begin with, right after the Davos incident, the statements in Yeni Şafak had 
concentrated on being “factually correct”. The statements were highlighting that “Peres 
accepted his fault” and the international and local community were approving Erdoğan  as 
the “correct” side. However, beginning with the third day after the Davos storm-out, the 
statements focus on creating a different culture and being right at exposing “different set of 
values”.  At this point the issue of legitimacy appears again: While Yeni Şafak enumerates 
support from international and local authorities, Cumhuriyet lists counter-arguments about 
Erdoğan ’s success.  
 
4.1.3.1 Position: 
The term “position” indicates an abstract place in socio-political continuum. In this study, 
parties’ positions might briefly be considered as being pro-East or pro-West. It has been 
discussed in Yeni Şafak that current diplomacy was “western fabricated” and thus was not 
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apt to Turkey171. Dominant western powers were controlling and manipulating the conflicts 
by the tools that they have “created”. So, in order to be able to stand against “oppression”, 
“injustice” and “atrocity”172, new sets of values and tools should be operationalized and 
Erdoğan  was the leader who was initiating this “right” move.  Yet again, Yeni Şafak 
expresses several statements from international press that certifies such change. There is a 
distinctive need to justify that such an initiative is the right move. Another point that has 
been expressed by Yeni Şafak can be considered as a will to change the status quo. 
Columnists discuss creating a “Sarajevo culture173” instead of a Davos culture, meaning 
that demolishing an away-from-public, elitist pure materialist Davos culture and 
maintaining Sarajevo culture that is based on “sharing”.  
 
On the other hand, Cumhuriyet has claimed that Erdoğan ’s act was a kind of declaration 
of not being on the “right” side.  Such attitude was a clear intent to break with the Western 
world and trying to consolidate the bond with the Arab world. Erdoğan ’s attitude should 
not be seen as taking the side of the oppressed, but should be interpreted as putting 
religious values and benefits over national values and benefits. So, Cumhuriyet announces 
that being in the international arena as a mouthpiece for Gaza signals the Islamisation of 
Turkey. 
 
 
                                                            
171 Nazif Gürdoğan, Yeni Şafak, 01.02.2009.  
172 Ibid.  
173 According to Nazif Gürdoğan the “Davos culture”, which is based on consumption, should be replaced by 
the “Sarajevo Culture” which is based on sharing. 
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4.2 Iranian Case 
The first important thing to note in the Iranian case study is Iran’s “not-free status” 
attributed by the Freedom House. The opposition in Iran generally transmitted its messages 
latently. Especially, criticisms which were directed to Ahmadinejad’s attitudes during 
Durban-II conference ceased suddenly and this might be related to heavy surveillance by 
government.  
 
There has been a distinct difference between the number of news drawn from Kayhan and 
Etemaad. While 52 news were drawn from Kayhan, only 24 news excerptswere drawn 
from Etemaad. This difference might be linked to the heavy surveillance of government 
over media and to the consequence of auto-censorship. Vast number of imprisoned 
journalists and banned newspapers might be inciting journalists to perform auto-
cencorship. 
IRNA, the control group for the Iranian case, possesses neither negative nor positive 
comments about Ahmadinejad’s speech at the Durban conference. Only eleven articles 
have been drawn from IRNA. It was quite interesting to not find any positive comments. 
However, it would be necessary to accentuate that negative reactions from the international 
media were also not reflected by the agency. IRNA was always as brief as possible while 
giving the news.  
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4.2.1 Control 
The conservative part of the Iranian case, Kayhan, does not mainly focus on the control 
issue. It is probable that as the opposition media in Iran is under strict control through 
censorship and amendments, the conservative media might not need to keep the control 
issue on the agenda. Yet, the statements in Kayhan underline that the Durban conference 
and that the attitude that Ahmadinejad displayed, affirmed the reasons that assert him being 
in charge.  
  
On the other hand, the first issue that attracts attention while examining statements drawn 
from Etemaad is that the criticism over Ahmadinejad’s attitudes start with comments over 
his style. Behrooz Behzadi indicates that the aggressive style that Ahmadinejad presented 
at the Durban conference was summarizing why Iran lacked support in the international 
arena174.  However, two days after the Durban conference, the criticism about 
Ahmadinejad’s “uncivilized” manners totally ceases. This can be related to the strictness of 
the Iranian regime about criticisms related with leaders’ personalities. Then, the 
evaluations and criticisms focus on how the leader wants to “control” all the media tools. 
Again, Behrooz Behzadi underlines that any criticism to Ahmadinejad was reflected by 
government aligned media as an act of treason175. This shift might be considered a way of 
highlighting the discontent of not being able to express ideas about how Ahmadinejad does 
not possess the appropriate attitude to represent Iran in the international arena. The most 
frequent statement that can be traced in Etemaad are about how Ahmadinejad wants to 
                                                            
174 Behrooz Behzadi, Etemaad, 31 Farvardin 1388. 
175 Behrooz Behzadi, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388. 
68 
 
utilize any opportunity in order to stage a misleading heroic image176.  Likewise, 
Ahmadinejad has been criticized for trying to employ such an important event as a tool for 
propaganda.  It is believed that Ahmadinejad’s attitudes had been planned in order to 
attract votes for the upcoming elections177. In brief, the opposition media underline how 
Ahmadinejad exploited Durban conference in order to increase his votes in the upcoming 
elections. 
 
As it was seen in the Turkish case, in both parties there is a constant effort for sustaining 
legitimacy by giving comments from the international media.  
 
 
4.2.1.1 Legitimacy:  
Kayhan, being close to the government circles, highlights the international support for 
Ahmadinejad’s speech.  The comments of the world leaders that find his speech 
honourable and right were quoted in the newspapers. Especially the support from the 
Lebanese and Syrian press were highlighted178. This illustrates the search of periphery for 
their recognition as the power holder. Constant criticisms over Ahmadinejad’s capability of 
representing Iran well especially in the international arena might have forced leader-
aligned media to underline international support. Ahmadinejad’s legitimacy has always 
been questioned because before 2005 presidential elections he had never run for office. 
                                                            
176 Elyas Hazrati, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388. 
177 Ali Malihi, Etemaad, 01 Ordibehesht 1388. 
178 Kayhan, 01 Ordibehesht 1388.  
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Before entering the 2005 presidential elections, he had been the mayor of Teheran for only 
two years and he had been appointed, not elected. This appointment has been evaluated as 
by-passing elections and as a result Ahmadinejad has always been experiencing an 
encounter with the legitimacy question. Even if he won the presidential elections of 2005 
by 62 percent, the reliability of these elections were also questioned. Consequently, the 
news gathered from international press that supports Ahmadinejad’s actions in the Durban 
Conference can be interpreted as a reflex to validate Ahmenijad’s standing in power.   
In contrary, Etemaad emphasized Bernard Kouchner’s comments about Ahmadinejad’s 
speech. Kouchner commented on the reasons to the desertion of several UN delegates 
while Ahmadinejad was giving his speech179. Kouchner accused Ahmadinejad for 
damaging the nature of the Durban conference by giving an anti-Semite speech.    
However, Etemaad has been severely criticized by Kayhan for collaborating with the 
“Zionists”. According to Kayhan, criticizing Ahmedinejad’s discourse is in a way denying 
the crimes committed by the “Zionist regime”.  After such accusations, Etemaad has not 
published any more views from the international authorities. Several imprisonments of 
journalists and bans against newspapers might have caused Iranian opposition to be more 
reticent in pursuing criticism on certain subjects. Reporters without Borders rank Iran’s 
press situation as very serious and underlines that Iran has more journalists in jail than any 
other country180. Such pressure over opposition media incites center’s trauma caused by 
Iranian Islamic revolution.  Center’s trauma can be traced between the lines while 
transmitting the news. On the other hand periphery reflects its own trauma, which is 
discussed in length, below. 
                                                            
179 Etemaad, 31 Farvardin 1388.  
180 http://en.rsf.org/iran-iran-12-03-2010,36684.html  
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4.2.1.2 Trauma: 
Most of the statements that are made in Kayhan, focuses on the rightfulness of values that 
Ahmadinejad represented in his Durban speech. It has been emphasized that 
Ahmadinejad’s attitude was definitely right because it was a bearing against “inhumane 
organizations of the West”181.  World public opinion had to be aware of the “Zionist 
conspiracies” and Ahmadinejad made it possible182. Moreover, Kayhan underlined that the 
Durban conference could be considered as a trap but Ahmadinejad managed to avoid 
falling into this trap. The periphery constantly highlighted possible traps that are prepared 
by the West. The constant fear from traps planted by the “evil West” can be linked with the 
periphery’s historical trauma:  The Iranian history incites Iranian periphery to align center 
with “imperialism”. In 1963, the Shah, under the direction of the U.S., embarked on a 
development program of economic, political and social reform which was launched by the 
Shah under the name of White Revolution. Designed by the U.S. policymakers, this 
program was apprehended, especially by the Iranian periphery, as a comprehensive 
imperialist effort to head off upheaval from below, strengthen the Shah’s regime, and turn 
Iran into a modern, more industrial society with a growing middle class and wider 
opportunities for foreign capital183.  This revolution was considered hostile against 
periphery as it did not aim any mobilization for the peasantry. Coupled with a program of 
selling state-owned industries to private investors and encouraging capitalist agribusiness 
and co-operatives, land reform helped “move landlord capital into industry and other urban 
                                                            
181 Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan, 01 Ordibehesht 1388. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 106-07, 110. 
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projects and to lay the basis for a state dominated capitalism in city and countryside”184.  
Such Jacobin westernization attempt forced Iranian periphery to perceive the notion of 
“West” in a negative connotation. 
On the other hand, Iranian revolution can be considered as an act to throw Iranian center 
away from the political power. Despite the westernization, modernization attack initiated 
by the Shah, the periphery was living not benefitting from these attempts. Over-ambitious 
socio-economic program of the Shah brought economic shortages and inflations that 
mostly the periphery endured185. Consequently, Iranian periphery supported a revolution 
that overthrew Iranian center from the power. Right after the success of the Iranian Islamic 
revolution the opposition inside the revolution was suppressed. National Democratic Front 
was banned in August 1979 and Muslim People’s Republican Party was banned in January 
1980. Moreover, in August 1979, after the election of the constitution-writing assembly 
several newspapers and magazines opposing Khomeini’s idea of theocratic rule by jurist 
were shut down186.  Such oppression created a trauma for center that caused a constant fear 
from current regimes’ political dynamics. For example, as indicated in “control” section of 
the Iranian case, Etemaad constantly underlines the difficulties that they encounter while 
they try to pursue their jobs187. Thoroughout the news exerted from Etemaad the pressure 
over them is accentuated and the reader can understand their purpose for a more liberal 
regime. This purpose might also be articulated as an effect of their fear from being cleared 
away, which can be related to their trauma.  
                                                            
184  Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, USA, 2003 p. 
144. 
185 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, Croom Helm, London, 1978, pp.17-19. 
186 Ashgar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, I.B. Tauris, 
London, New York, 1998, pp.50-52.  
187 Behrooz Behzadi, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388. 
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4.2.2 Style: 
To begin with, Kayhan cherished Ahmadinejad’s style, as it was again the same in the 
Turkish case, for being “direct” and “bold”. His attitude of not halting to read where 
several delegates were leaving the room was embraced as a noteworthy act188. This 
acknowledgement can be considered as a symbolic relief for Iran’s marginalized peripheral 
ruling class. This class, being isolated for around about thirty years, was staying in the UN 
conference room, which symbolized the international system, where some others were 
feeling obliged to leave.  This time, an attempted act of isolation was keeping them in the 
international milieu. Kayhan has repeatedly underlined that the desertion of some delegates 
was not Ahmadinejad’s fault because the ones that had left exhibited their unwillingness to 
hear the voice of the “Iranian people”.  Iran was willing to cooperate and communicate 
with Zionist regime and Western collaborators were refusing even to communicate.189 So, 
Ahmadinejad was successful in showing how collaborative Iran was but at the same time 
he exposed this will of collaboration without giving any compensations. 
 
On the other hand, in the very first news in Etemaad about Ahmadinejad’s Durban 
performance, the main criticism has been that Ahmadinejad does not know the rules of 
how to act in the international arena190. Ahmadinejad and his advisors were blamed for not 
knowing how to employ diplomatic skills to gain support in an international setting191. 
                                                            
188 Hossein Shariatmadari, 02 Ordibehesht 1388. 
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190 Ali Malihi, 01 Ordibehesht 1388. 
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Furthermore, Ahmadinejad has been accused for emitting a bad image of Iran and Iranians. 
It is questioned if it has to be Ahmadinejad who represents a country which constitutes “a 
civilization of five thousand years”192.  Ahmadinejad’s incapability of being a political 
leader was proven by his inconvenient acts in Durban conference193. 
 
Yet again, similar to the Turkish case, while Kayhan was utilizing words that has acquired 
spiritual connotations, Etemaad intended to evaluate Ahmadinejad’s performance through 
a more prgamatic perspective.  
 
  
4.2.2.1 Materialism vs. Spirituality.  
The adjectives that are most frequently used to describe Ahmedijad’s are “dignified194” and 
“honourable195”. Ahmedinjad’s position during the Durban conference was cherished also 
by linking Ayatollah Khomeini’s philosophy. Kayhan underlined that Ahmadinejad gave a 
lesson on how to apply Ayatollah Khomeini’s principles to diplomacy. His politeness and 
dignity while giving his speech gave a lesson of love to the entire world that he had learned 
from Imam Khomeini196.   Ayatollah Khomeini, as a leader that had defended a theocratic 
system put religious and moral values ahead of pragmatic needs. For example, Khomeini 
strongly opposed close relations with neither Eastern or with Western bloc. He suggested 
                                                            
192 Hegameh Shahidi, Etemaad, 02 Ordibehesht 1388. 
193 Etemaad, 01 Ordibehesht, 1388. 
194 Hossein Shariatmadari, 31 Farvardin 1388. 
195 Ibid. 
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that Islamic world should form its own bloc197. He based this belief on spiritual, religious 
values rather than a pragmatic calculation of world dynamics. This understanding 
influences peripheral political figures throughout their experiences in the political arena.  
On the other hand, Etemaad, criticized Ahmadinejad’s speech for not being able to 
appraise the chance to re-bond Iran with the outer world. He has also been blamed for just 
accusing other countries in his speech but never mentioning any projects about Iran. 
Hence, Etemaad underlined the difficulty to consider Ahmadinejad’s speech as a 
successful foreign policy act. Here, we see that Etemaad exposed a pragmatic calculation 
of what would be beneficial for Iran’s position in the international arena. Religious and 
moral evaluation of Ahmadinejad’a attitude was tried to be kept aside. Besides, Khomeini 
has been criticized by the opposition as unsuccessful in pursuing a beneficial foreign 
policy. The opposition underlined that even if it was  Saddam Husayn of Iraq who started 
the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, Iranian forces went on the offensive in July 1982; 
and it was Khomeini who continued the fighting for another six years. The war, which cost 
some 300,000 lives and uncounted billions of dollars, ended in discreditable failure for 
Khomeini, who likened the decision to accept a cease-fire to “drinking poison.” Moreover, 
from Khomeini’s perspective, allocating so many resources to Iran-Iraq war meant 
postponing the spread of the revolution to Lebanon and Afghanistan198.  
 
 
 
                                                            
197 Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2000,  pp.54-62. 
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4.2.3 Right 
Kayhan propounded that Ahmadinejad exposed a right attitude by underlining that his 
actions were apt to the road Ayatollah Khomeini traced. Khomeini expressed that the 
essential of Iranian Islamic revolution was to serve the interests of Islam and the divine 
government” of the Islamic state199.  Here we see periphery, influenced by the doctrines of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, validates religion over nation.   
 
On the other hand, when we evaluate the statements in Etemaad through the grills of moral 
rightfulness, it would be fair to state that the main point is Ahmadinejad’s fault at putting 
personal benefits over national benefits. According to Etemaad, Ahmadinejad should have 
utilized this opportunity to ameliorate Iran’s image in the international arena. However, he 
aimed to employ this opportunity as a way to increase his popularity at home. This would 
bring us to mention another conflict between leader-aligned media and opposition media: a 
conflict between having an emphasis on nation or religion. 
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4.2.3.1 Nation vs. Religion 
 
The title of Nation vs. Religion highlights the difference between leader-aligned media and 
opposition media on whether privileging the notion of “Iranian nation” or “Islamic 
community”. Leader-aligned media advocates that Iran’s development is related with 
Islam’s rise and growth. On the other hand, opposition media defends that Iran’s citizens’ 
needs are neglected in order to purse the delusion of being the leader of Islamic world.   
 
 Kayhan has continually indicated how Ahmadinejad was standing against Zionist 
conspiracies and “fighting” in the name of the entire world of Islam. As Khomeini 
accentuated the necessity to fight against Zionism and Western imperialism, periphery 
embraced the thought of prioritizing the idea of being the guardian of Islamic revolution. 
During his speech in Qom, in 13 March 1979, Khomeini said: “Don't listen to those who 
speak of democracy. They all are against Islam. They want to take the nation away from its 
mission. We will break all the poisonous pens of those who speak of nationalism, 
democracy, and such things.”200 This quote elucidates periphery’s dedication to put 
religion over nation, Islam over nationalism. Ahmadinejad, being a member of the 
                                                            
200 Ayatollah Khomeini qtd in Yonah Alexander, Milton M. Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership: 
Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East, Greenwood Publishing Group, USA, 
2008, p.26. 
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periphery and a committed follower of Khomeini acts according to these thoughts. 
Ahmadinejad underlines, in every occasion, his commitment to Imam Khomeini201. 
 
On the other hand, according to Etemaad, the main aim of the Durban Conference  should 
have been improving foreign relations instead of “cheap”, “populist” showdowns. As 
stated earlier, Ahmadinejad’s speech focused on blaming other countries for their various 
actions but did not talk enough about Iran. However this opportunity could have been 
employed to tell the “right” things about Iran and present them its true image. Moreover, 
Ahmadinejad has been blamed for brandishing a populist culture which has no principles. 
The statements focus on the leader’s incapability of providing a vision for the future.  
However, we cannot trace any comments that clearly indicate the necessity to privilege the 
notion of “nation” rather than “religion”. In the Iranian context, it would be critical and 
controversial to express such an argument directly.  Such expression would be 
contradicting to Khomeini’s discourse, which is not tolerated in Iran.  
To conclude, the analysis of the Iranian case enables us to see that the conflict between 
leader-aligned media and opposition media starts in the style section. The opposition media 
criticizes the style of the leader in handling crisis; on the other hand leader-aligned media 
cherishes his actions by underlining the virtue in his moves. However, as the days go on, 
the discussions appear to be about the nature of the political regime. Center and periphery 
clash with each other whether the emphasis should be on “nation” or on “religion”. It is 
                                                            
201 For example, on October 25th, 2005  during his speech at the Ministry of Interior conference hall n 
Teheran, he said “ The Imam(Khomeini) said this regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of 
time”. In this infamous speech, it can be realized that Ahmadinejad’s rage against Israel is shaped with the 
sayings of Imam Khomeini.  
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also possible to trace periphery’s fear from “West” and center’s fear from “the institutions 
Islamic Revolution. Center and periphery’s traumas can also be realizing in the frame of 
leader-media conflict that appeared after the Durban II speech of Ahmadinejad. 
  
4.3 Cross-Relational Analysis 
First of all, comparing the Turkish and Iranian cases allowed us to recognize the difference 
between media developments in free and not free countries. This is obvious in both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis.  While the number of news from both sides was 
almost equal in the Turkish case, in the Iranian case, there was a major difference between 
the center and the peripheral news. Qualitatively, there is also a difference in the way 
center and peripheral media presented these conferences in Turkey and in Iran. In Iran, the 
opposition media had to convey messages latently. However in Turkey, the opposition 
media, Cumhuriyet was able to publish serious accusations about the leader.  
Nevertheless, even if the level of freedom is different between two countries, in both cases 
there was a constant effort for validating legitimacy for their arguments. Both the periphery 
and the center were trying to support their positions and arguments by presenting 
comments from several authorities. This constant attempt to look for international 
validation of their political representation might be interpreted as an indicator of problems 
in their political regime. If there has been a functioning democracy in these countries, 
theoretically the legitimacy of political power holder could have been validated thorough 
fair elections. However, even after maintaining the majority of the votes202, peripheral 
                                                            
202 Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections in 2005 by taking 62% of the votes and AKP won the general 
elections of 2007 by collecting 46,58% of the votes. 
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leaders in these countries needed to highlight international support for their mandate’s 
legitimacy. These attempts to validate their mandate through international support were 
clearly seen after the discourse analysis.  
Another conflict can be observed over what have been discussed under the title of the 
“status quo”. In Iran, the center advocates a change in order to alternate the dynamics that 
had been set after the Islamic revolution. However, in the Turkish case, the center 
promotes maintaining the status quo in order to hinder a fully “centralized periphery”. In 
Turkey, the defense of status quo by the center can be explained by their fear of 
experiencing an Islamic revolution in Turkey. The center in Turkey is afraid of change 
because the center believes that there is a possibility of experiencing the same process that 
Iran experienced after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The fear of being totally put out of 
the political arena might be forcing the center to defend a status quo of political dynamics 
in Turkey. On the other hand, in Iran, the periphery defended the necessity to preserve the 
status quo in political arena because the periphery fear that any change in political life or 
regime might cause a total collapse of the regime. The complex political regime in Iran 
though to be viable only because of the charisma of the religious leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini and since his death there is always a fear of a total collapse of this complex 
political regime.   
It has been salient to detect that both in Turkey and Iran, the periphery employed words 
with spiritual connotations. On the other hand center tried to pursue analysis based on 
relatively pragmatic measures.  
Yet again, it has been appealing to contemplate that each party to the conflict, but 
especially the periphery, possessed certain traumas. For an inter-group conflict to occur, 
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the opponents must have a sense of collective identity about themselves and about their 
identity203. The historical traumas might help to build up these collective identities. 
According to Cohen and Young204, groups and social classes form their image, the 
meaning of their lives and their appraisal of those who are not part of them through the 
media. The media supplies public “social knowledge”. It serves as a base for the formation 
of a personal identity and the distinction between us and others. As in many other social 
fields, media coverage also involves issues of power. The access of different social groups 
to the media is not equal. For example in the Iranian case, because of the power dispartity, 
the opposition media had little opportunity to diffuse its arguments. This fact is evident 
both in the extensive and favorable coverage of “powerful” groups that contribute to the 
endorsement of their legitimacy as those with power.  In both Turkish and Iranian cases the 
group that was aligned with the current political power aimed to legitimize its values, 
political positions and lifestyles. In brief, as it has been seen throughout this study, media 
is effective in confirming constructed collective identities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
203 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts from Escalation to Resolution, Rowman & Littlefield, NY, 
2003, p.91. 
204 S. Cohen and J. Young, The Manufacture of News. Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media, 
Sage Publications, London, 1981. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main aspiration of this study was to provide a different approach to leader-media 
conflicts by looking from center-periphery paradigm.  I believed such analysis would 
provide a more complete understanding of why leaders and media conflict with each other.  
As mentioned in the second chapter, literature review revealed that leader- media and 
center- periphery conflicts show certain parallelism and this parallelism can be 
summarized under three sections.: “control”, “style” and “right”. These three categories 
provided me a starting point to work on through a discourse analysis. As new categories 
and sub-categories emerged, understanding the role of social structuring over leader-media 
conflicts become clearer.   
 
The literature review in this study allowed me to enumerate certain parallelism between 
leader-media and center-periphery conflicts: There is a constant encounter between leader 
and media as well as center and periphery over the control of sanctions and enforcements. 
Secondly, media contradict with leader over his/her style of acting while performing in the 
international arena or handling a domestic issue. Likewise, center and periphery experience 
clashing life-styles (which can be summarized as a conflict between modernist and 
conservative life-styles). Last but not least, media and leader, as well as center and 
periphery, can be in conflict over the definition of what is right. All these three categories 
allowed me to unveil sub-categories which elucidate parallelism between leader-media and 
center-periphery confrontations. 
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General findings from the discourse analysis illustrated that the media and leader confront 
with each other like center confront with periphery over the control of information. Media 
can utilize information to challenge leader’s authority and legitimacy. Such criticism might 
create a conflict with leader that might cause his/her fall of the power. Thereupon, it can be 
realized that behind the conflicts of leader and media, there exists a “legitimacy” issue. 
After the analysis of Turkish and Iranian cases, problematic of legitimacy reveals an 
inconvenience with political regimes of these countries.  Even if the leaders won the 
elections they search for international support and appreciation for their presence in power.  
Moreover, findings that appeared through data analysis allowed me to underline that leader 
and media conflicts might be caused by historical traumas. These historical traumas can be 
viewed as root causes for several leader-media conflicts. Current conflicts might be better 
understood and analyzed by revealing a possible historical trauma that might be triggering 
it.    
 
Another point that findings highlight is that leader and media confrontations might reveal 
latent value differences. One group’s fundamental belief about the best way to live may 
vary radically from the values that are cherished by another group. Parties may have 
different definitions of rightness. Likewise, parties may give fundamentally different 
answers to moral questions. When groups have different definition of the right life-style, 
they may develop incompatible goals that can lead to conflict. Values are stable and people 
are often unwilling to compromise on value related issues. Sets of values also have an 
effect on patterns of thinking. So, this study allows us to better understand a leader’s 
decision and conflict with the media because it allows us to include leader’s relation to a 
certain social setting. Media conflict with leader over his/her style of handling problems or 
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issues. Center and periphery embrace contradicting life-styles and values; and actors in 
center and periphery try to influence each other. Media and leader can be currently in 
conflict over what is the right attitude to handle a problem.  Center and periphery confront 
each other to place their values to the center of political structure in order to define the 
notion of “right”. As seen in the literature review, when interpreting conflict-related 
information, people use their cognitive processes. John Burton indicates, it would be 
harder to negotiate on value-related issues.  He also adds that in a value-related conflict 
negotiating is harder because positions, interests and needs of each party are based on 
cognitive notions. Parties have difficulties in defining a solid, concrete relation between 
each other; thus finding commonalities and conciliating both parties becomes harder and 
more complicated. This kind of a confrontation can also be perceived in the analysis of this 
study. 
 
When Turkish and Iranian cases are compared, it can be seen that the subcategories that 
emerge through discourse analysis are similar. Yet, in Iranian case, opposition media do 
not mention any possible traumatic events that would be a part of their collective memory. 
However, this difference might be because of a strict prohibition of any opposition against 
the Iranian Islamic revolution. 
 
Another importance of this study is that it provides us the possibility to evaluate the role of 
democracy in leader media conflicts.  Iran and Turkey were selected as parts of this 
comparative case study because they allowed us to apply a most similar case design. The 
only difference between these two cases that Iran is qualified as “not free” while Turkey is 
labeled as a “free” country by Freedom House reports. This study shows that democracy 
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allows media to represent different sets of values. In Turkey, the opposition media was 
able to criticize harshly leader’s style during his performance in the international arena. 
Likewise, the opposition media in Turkey was able to speak out its historical trauma, 
paranoia of an Islamic revolution. However, in Iran, the opposition media did not have any 
chance to latently express its fears and traumas. Direct criticisms about leader’s style in 
handling an international crisis were limited. The major difference between the number of 
news drawn from Kayhan and Etemaad illustrates the pressure on opposition media205.  
 
Furthermore, this study also aimed to bring a contribution to conflict resolution field by 
employing center-periphery dynamics to analyze intergroup conflicts. The notion of 
centre-periphery had only been used in conflict resolution while examining post-Soviet 
intergroup conflicts in ex-Soviet countries; however this study utilizes center-periphery 
paradigm to explain an intergroup conflict mainly linked with modernization process.  
 
To conclude, this study is important because it aimed to combine two dissimilar areas in 
order to provide a deeper understanding to a relatively less studied subject: leader-media 
conflicts. In order to approve the validity of this deeper understanding, similar research 
design might be applied to cases in different region of the world. Such application would 
help to formulate a better and a more complete evaluation of a leader.  
 
 
 
                                                            
205 This pressure can be practically observed while trying to access internet sites of opposition newspapers. It 
takes a very long time to open these sites while any other site can be easily accessed at the same time 
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Table 3 
Comparing Themes and Sub-themes in Turkish and Iranian Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTROL 
  Turkey Iran 
legitimacy Center  Proving inaptness 
of current 
political leader 
Highlighting 
pressure exerted 
on them 
 Periphery Affirming their 
presence in 
political power 
None 
Status Quo Center  Maintaining 
current foreign 
policy dynamics 
Demanding a 
more liberal 
regime  
 Periphery Adapting a new 
understanding in 
foreign policy 
Protecting the 
complex nature 
of the current 
political regime 
Trauma Center Ottoman Empire 
experience 
Iranian Islamic 
Revoltuion 
 Periphery February 28 White 
Revolution 
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STYLE 
  Turkey  Iran 
Materialism vs. 
Spirituality 
Center  Pragmatic 
measures 
Pragmatic 
measures 
 Periphery Basing on virtue Basing on virtue 
Individualistic vs. 
Collectivist 
culture 
Center Individualistic  Individualistic 
 Periphery Collectivist  Collectivist 
 
 
 
 
RIGHT 
  Turkey Iran 
Position Center  Pro-West None 
 Periphery Pro-East None 
Nation vs. 
Religion 
Center None Nation 
 Periphery None Religion 
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